



Strategic Review of Electronic Arts

Part 4: Leveraged Buyout

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Executive Summary

Part 1: Company Analysis

Business Model, Operating Performance, Capital Requirements

Part 2: Industry Analysis

Value Chain, Competitive Field, Corporate Finance Activity

Part 3: Valuation Analysis

DCF, Comparables, Precedents

▶ Part 4: Leveraged Buyout

Transaction Structure, Returns, Viability

Part 5: Transaction Analysis

M&A Opportunities

Website | NIBC.ca
Competitor Portal | Nibclive.com

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Leveraged Buyout: Assumptions & Results

Leveraged buyout of EA might be challenging given valuation, premium and size of equity check

	2010A	2011A	2012A	2013A	2014A	2015E	2016E	2017E	2018E	2019E	2020E
Historical & Forecasted EBITDA (\$m)	\$388	\$493	\$613	\$631	\$944	\$1,037	\$1,156	\$1,261	\$1,359	\$1,447	\$1,557

Key Assumptions	Base Case	Upside Case	Notes & Constraints for Upside Case
PF Leverage	6.0x	7.0x	Industry typically uses less debt
Premium	20%	15%	Could justify lower premium since assume sellers get 2015 dividend
Exit Multiple	10.0x	13.0x	Exit multiple exceeds current valuation
Senior / Junior Interest	5.0% / 7.0%	5.5% / 7.5%	Higher rates required for higher leverage
Transaction Date	FY2015 Year End		
Holding Period	5 Years		
Key Results	Base Case	Upside Case	
IRR	12.7%	25.4%	
Sponsor Check	\$7,177m	\$5,527m	
Senior / Junior Debt (\$m)	\$3,630 / \$2,593	\$4,148 / \$3,111	
Implied Entry Multiple	14.4x		

IRR Sensitivity Analysis (from base case)

	Exit Multiple		
	9.0 x	10.0 x	11.0 x
Base Case	9.9%	12.7%	15.3%
Premium: 15%	11.7%	14.6%	17.2%
Premium: 25%	8.2%	11.0%	13.5%
Leverage: 5.0x	9.3%	11.8%	14.1%
Leverage: 7.0x	10.6%	13.8%	16.7%

Levered returns in expected base case and reasonable upside sensitivities is relatively low for attractive LBO candidate

Buyer would have to bank on exit multiple being significant on what will be a fairly mature company at the time

Leveraged Buyout: Transaction Structure

Moderately rich valuation and limited leverage results in large quantum of required sponsor equity (\$7,117mm)

Use of Funds			Source of Funds							
Parent Equity Market Value at \$35.96	11,363	76.1%	Senior Debt						3,630	24.3%
Parent Equity Premium (20%)	2,273	15.2%	Junior Debt						2,593	17.4%
Equity Value	13,636	91.3%	Revolver						-	-%
Debt Retired / Assumed	1,037	6.9%	Assumed Debt						-	-%
Transaction Costs	261	1.7%	Total Debt						6,223	41.7%
			Sponsor Equity						7,117	47.7%
			Excess Balance Sheet Cash (Shortfall)						1,594	10.7%
Total Funds Uses	14,934	100%	Total Funds Sources	14,934	100%					

*All dollar amounts in millions	Post-LBO Transaction										
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015E	2016E	2017E	2018E	2019E	2020E	
Revenue	3,828	4,186	3,793	4,021	4,132	4,501	4,742	5,017	5,301	5,622	
Revenue Growth	(8.0)%	9.4%	(9.4)%	6.0%	2.8%	8.9%	5.3%	5.8%	5.7%	6.1%	
EBITDA	493	613	631	944	1,037	1,157	1,261	1,360	1,447	1,557	
EBITDA Margin	12.9%	14.6%	16.6%	23.5%	25.1%	25.7%	26.6%	27.1%	27.3%	27.7%	
Taxes	(90)	(110)	(102)	(178)	(199)	(149)	(183)	(216)	(247)	(284)	
Capex	(59)	(172)	(106)	(97)	(103)	(113)	(119)	(125)	(133)	(141)	
Change in Working Capital	18	(131)	(97)	(102)	17	45	15	28	32	36	
Adjusted EBITDA (CFADS)	362	200	326	567	752	940	975	1,046	1,100	1,169	
Interest Expense on Existing Debt	10	(3)	(1)	(5)	(39)						
Senior LBO Debt Interest Expense	-	-	-	-	-	(181)	(153)	(121)	(83)	(42)	
Junior LBO Debt Interest Expense	-	-	-	-	-	(181)	(181)	(181)	(181)	(181)	
Mandatory Debt Service (Interest Expense)	10	(3)	(1)	(5)	(39)	(363)	(334)	(302)	(265)	(223)	
Adj. EBITDA / Total Interest Expense						2.6x	2.9x	3.5x	4.2x	5.2x	
Adj. EBITDA / Senior Interest Expense						5.2x	6.4x	8.7x	13.2x	28.0x	
Debt/EBITDA						4.9x	4.0x	3.1x	2.4x	1.6x	
Debt Repayment	-	(633)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Equity Issuance (Repurchase) including Restricted Cash Movements	-	(428)	(327)	67	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Financing Drawn	-	(1,061)	(327)	67	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Dividends	-	-	-	-	(1,978)	-	-	-	-	-	
FCF for LBO Debt Repayment	372	(864)	(2)	629	(1,265)	577	641	744	835	946	
Repayment of LBO Debt	-	-	-	-	-	(577)	(641)	(744)	(835)	(946)	
CF from LBO Structure	-	-	-	15,563	(1,264)	-	-	-	-	-	
Equity IRR											
LBO Sponsor Equity					(7,117)						
Sale Proceeds										15,573	
Excess Cash										-	
Repayment of Debt										(2,481)	
Residual Cashflows										-	
Transaction Costs (Exit)										(156)	
Cash Flows to Equity	IRR:	12.7%				(7,117)	-	-	-	-	12,937
Outstanding Debt Balance					2015E	2016E	2017E	2018E	2019E	2020E	
Senior Debt at 5.0%					3,630	3,053	2,413	1,669	834	-	
Junior Debt at 7.0%					2,593	2,593	2,593	2,593	2,593	2,481	
Revolver Debt at 0.0%					-	-	-	-	-	-	
Assumed Debt at 4.7%					-	-	-	-	-	-	
Total Debt					6,223	5,646	5,005	4,261	3,427	2,481	

Several industry and company factors make an LBO challenging even though the environment is favorable

LBO Viability

■ Macro environment favorable towards LBO transactions

- Relatively low financing rates
- Significant dry powder held by financial sponsors

■ Company economics are somewhat supportive of LBO

- Recent growth in EBITDA with sizeable cash flows and expected growth trajectory driven by margin expansion
- Proven franchises and strong market position support likelihood of continued revenue growth
- Pure-play nature and strong franchises increase attractiveness to strategic buyer in exit
- Clean balance sheet with net cash position

■ Several factors could constrain LBO structure

- Lack of track record of stable free cash flows forecasted in future
- Forecast already includes significant revenue growth and margin improvement which limits further upside
- Nature of industry is considered volatile given hit-driven nature of game releases, not many LBOs in video games or entertainment
- Stock price at 5-year high and valuation at a premium to console peers suggests the stock might be expensive
- Uncertain prospects about achieving exit multiple that is similar to entry multiple considering mature cycle of company
- Debt capacity restricted by future cash flow uncertainty, which constrains IRR depending on premium
- Large capitalization requires large equity check, which could be prohibitive for any single sponsor (club deals have become less prevalent)
- Key question is size of equity premium and how much cash on hand and from operations will be paid as dividend

Category	Input Values	Comments
Leverage (2015 Debt / EBITDA)	6.0x	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of track record of stable free cashflows combined with volatile nature of industry limit debt capacity Unpredictable changes in technology could significantly impact the industry and further limit debt capacity However, debt capacity is supported by forecasted free cashflows expected to stabilize and grow through margin expansion Sizeable cashflows enable rapid deleveraging to 1.6x by 2020 assuming 6.0x pro forma leverage Interest coverage at 6.0x pro forma leverage is sufficient, with 2016 Adj. EBITDA / Interest Expense at 2.6x and 2016 Adj. EBITDA / Senior Interest Expense at 5.2x Lack of notable precedent LBOs in industry limit comfort around high leverage Close comps' low-to-mid-range leverage do not demonstrate ability of video game developers to take on high degrees of leverage (2013 Debt / EBITDA of Activision Blizzard at 2.8x and Take Two at 0.7x) Tranching at 1.4 : 1 senior debt : junior debt ratio
Interest Rates	5.0% senior 7.0% junior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Benchmarked to Activision Blizzard (3.5% term loan and 6.125% ten-year notes); assumed higher rates given higher leverage and less historical cashflow stability
Premium	20%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Typical premium for current LBO transactions Note that underlying EA cashflow model assumes seller receives levered dividend recapitalization on back of strong results in 2015 in which case seller may accept lower premium However, EA has also significant upside potential in short to medium-term
Exit Multiple	10.0x	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implied entry multiple is 13.3x; exit multiple conservatively assumed to be slightly lower given current valuation is moderately rich and significant multiple expansion is unlikely Activision Blizzard's current LTM multiple is 11.8x Significant EBITDA margin improvements already assumed in forecast
Synergies	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Significant EBITDA margin improvements already assumed in forecast