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NATIONAL INVESTMENT BANKING COMPETITION & CONFERENCE

SUMMARY CASE EXCERPTS ONLY - FOR PREVIEW

This summary provides a preview of key case components for individuals looking to compete. Please sign up a team at www.nibc.ca to download the full case package & templates.



Welcome Letter

Dear 2018-2019 Competitors,

Thank you for competing in the NIBC 2018 Global Investment Banking Competition. Since inception, our goal has been to create a unique opportunity for investment banking candidates to develop their skills and be recognized by recruiters on a global stage.

The First Round puts you in the position of an Analyst and Associate at an origination desk developing new ideas for a client, while the Final Round places you in the Director seat on a live transaction.

Once you have worked through this package, you will have learned how to create a full-fledged investment banking pitchbook ready to be sent to a client. To help you on this journey, you have been provided with model templates, slide templates, past case examples and detailed instructions, which you customarily would have access to at an investment bank. This approach is designed to help you adopt best practices and produce client-ready work within quick turnaround times.

We would like to thank our growing number of past organizing team members, who have pursued investment banking careers in New York, London, Hong Kong, Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver and have contributed to the case, templates and training materials.

Please take the time to review the rules & regulations outlined in this package and direct any inquiries to Eric Hall (<u>Eric.Hall@nibc.ca</u>) and Mehtaab Chandi (<u>Mehtaab.Chandi@nibc.ca</u>) copied to both team members.

We wish all teams much success and hope to see you at the Final Round in Vancouver, Canada on March 13th to 15th, 2019.

The NIBC Board & Organizing Team,

Eric Hall | Associate Director, Competition **Mehtaab Chandi** | Case Manager





| 1. | Templates | 4 |
|-----|--|-----|
| 2. | Scenario | 5 |
| 3. | Company | 6 |
| 4. | Deliverables | 9 |
| | SUMMARY EXCERPTS ONLY - FOR PREVIEW | |
| 5. | Technical Guidance | 13 |
| | A. Company & Industry Analysis | |
| | B. Discounted Cash Flow Valuation | |
| | C. Trading Comparables Valuation | |
| | D. Precedent Transactions Valuation | |
| | E. Leveraged Buyout Valuation | |
| | F. Strategic Transaction Advice | |
| | G. Financial Model Submission | |
| | H. Pitchbook Submission | |
| | I. Video Submission | |
| | J. Team Member Profiles | |
| | K. Attachments to Case Package A-D | |
| 6. | Submission Rules | 40 |
| 7. | Contact Us | 42 |
| 8. | Participating Schools | 43 |
| 9. | Sponsors & Partners | 44 |
| 10. | NIBC Final Round | 45 |
| Att | achment A: Industry Overview | 49 |
| Att | achment B: Precedent Transaction Summaries | 62 |
| Att | achment C: Team Profile Templates | 98 |
| Att | achment D: Model Output Templates | 102 |
| | | |



Legal Disclaimer

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1. Templates

Industry Templates & Resources

Please see below a list of suggested resources to aid you in the submission for the Corporate Valuation and Strategic Review of Tapestry.

- Originality: You may use all of the templates provided by NIBC subject to modifying and creating
 your own designs; as a deal team you cannot replicate the templates of other banks without making
 some meaningful modifications.
- The key to delivering high-quality work product under time-pressure is to utilize existing materials and then allocate more time to customizing and improving them.
- Make sure you do not submit slides populated with irrelevant or old information relating to a different pitch or deal, which looks extremely unprofessional.
- Please note that past case examples are meant to be used as reference only as each pitch needs to emphasize a different set of topics relevant to the particular situation.

Required model template to filled in

Required Resources (Requires Access to Competitor Portal)

| Zo ro moder rempiate (| (<u>=xooi</u>) | required ineder template to lined in | |
|------------------------|------------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| | 0 (555) | 5 | |

| Attachment A: Industry (| Overview (<u>PDF</u>) | Required model outp | uts for pitchbook appendix |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|
| | | | |

Attachment B: Precedent Transactions (PDF) Precedent transaction summaries

Attachment C: Team Profile Template (PDF, PPT)

Ream member profile template for pitchbook

Attachment D: Model Outputs Template (PDF, PPT) Model outputs template for pitchbook

Suggested Resources

2018 Model Template (Excel)

| IB Research Guide (PDF) | Investment banking research guide |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | |

Pitchbook Templates Library (<u>Web</u>)

Collection of slide templates for valuation pitchbooks

Pitchbook Tutorials (<u>Video Series</u>)

Pitchbook Instructions (Chapter 1 MANDATORY)

CV & CL Writing Guide (PDF) Guidelines of refining resumes and cover letters

CV & CL Sample (Word) Example of model resume and cover letter

CV Blank Template (Word) Blank resume template

Full Sample Case Pitchbook (PDF) Example of valuation & strategic review pitchbook

Full Sample Case Model (Excel) Example of valuation model

Fundamental Concepts

IB Competitor Workshop (PDF) Introduction to fundamental corporate finance concepts

Corporate Finance Industry (Video) Overview of capital markets

Full-Service Investment Bank (Video) Overview of full-service investment bank

IB Interview Topics (PDF) Common IB topics discussed in interviews

Important Disclaimer: The information contained herein is copyrighted, proprietary and has not been reviewed for external publication or audited and therefore should not be relied on or used for any other purpose than for training as stated here.



2. The Scenario

From: Head of Consumer Retail, Managing Director

To: Consumer Retail Group (New York)

Subject: Tapestry Initiating Coverage – Valuation & Strategic Review

Deal Team,

Greetings from the Maldives – incredible weather here vs NYC. Just got a call from the CFO of Tapestry. As you know, I've been meeting with a few corporates looking at potential transactions in consumer retail. They are particularly interested in our views on secular trends and consolidation in luxury fashion.

One of the hot topics is Michael Kors given its recent acquisition of Versace (\$2.1bn). Our competitor snapped up the role due to their relationship with the PE firm (even my Wharton network didn't help!) They now have a growing foothold in the emerging North American luxury market. Shame we missed out.

That being said, I believe the space has significant fee potential if we build the right relationships and position ourselves for the next deal. I've initiated coverage on Tapestry and told the CFO they can expect some valuation work and strategic alternatives in the next few weeks.

Sorry for the short turnaround but I'm hoping it wont be quite as bad if we use our templates. We will need to demonstrate that we know the company and industry like no one else and can pitch quality ideas.

Also note the VP is taking advantage of some well-deserved vacation days (congrats on the deal) so this engagement falls entirely in the hands of our talented juniors.

I realize the holidays are fast approaching but this is a great opportunity for you to step up and come closer to replacing the VP and perhaps even myself ... lol (not)

Thanks in advance. Please have this fully vetted on my desk before I'm back on January 30th.

Cheers and best of the season (from the Maldives)!

MD

3. Company Information

Corporate Overview

Name: Tapestry, Inc.

Exchange / Ticker: NYSE / TPR

Share Price: \$38.93

52-Week Range: \$36.72 - \$55.50

Market Cap: \$11,282m *As of Nov 30, 2018*

Cash and Equivalents: \$1,243m

Total Debt: \$1,601m

FY 2018 Revenues: \$5,880m FY 2018 EBITDA: \$1,147m FY 2018 Net Income: \$398m FY 2018 Diluted EPS: \$0.42 Fiscal Year 2018 ended Jun 30, 2018



Tapestry, Inc., previously known as Coach Inc., is an American multinational company with the rights to luxury fashion houses Coach, Kate Spade, and Stuart Weitzman. The company's namesake brand, Coach, was founded in 1941 out of a Manhattan loft and did an IPO for \$118m at the turn of the century. Since then, Coach has acquired Stuart Weitzman (\$574m) in 2015 followed by Kate Spade (\$2.4b) in 2017. As a result of their Kate Spade acquisition, Coach folded all three brands under their current name, Tapestry. Headquartered in Manhattan, New York, this American fashion conglomerate operates over 670 stores across North America and 762 internationally. In addition to the revenue derived from brick and mortar locations and online, Tapestry plays an active role in licensing their brands to partners such as Luxottica for eyewear, and various wholesale distributors such as Nordstrom.

Amidst a consolidation trend within the market for luxury brands, Tapestry continues to face fierce competition against other fashion conglomerates and one-off brands. The company remains committed towards driving global growth, however, fueling brand innovation and meticulously engineering products made from the finest materials for a flawless fit – both on and off the red carpet.

| Net Sales Components | Net Sales (| FY 2018) |
|----------------------|-------------|----------|
| Coach | \$4,222m | 71.79% |
| Kate Spade | \$1,285m | 21.85% |
| Stuart Weitzman | \$374m | 6.36% |
| Total | \$5,880m | 100% |

Sources: Company reports, all figures USD unless specified otherwise

3. Company Information

Fiscal 2018 Highlights

| Acquisition Synergies | Tapestry experienced strong results driven by their recent acquisition of Kate Spade and organic growth. While revenues grew to \$5.9b, up 31% to 2017's \$4.5b, operating income increased 22% from \$813m to \$992m. Diluted EPS had a growth of 22%, standing at \$2.63 vs last year's \$2.15, highlighting the success of Tapestry's newfound stature as a true house of brands. |
|----------------------------|---|
| Sales Outlook | For brands Coach and Stuart Weitzman, sales increased by 2.60% and 0.05% respectively YoY. Excluding the favorable impact of foreign currency, real sales increased only 1.6% for Coach while decreasing the same amount for Stuart Weitzman. |
| Competitive Environment | Tapestry operates in a fiercely competitive environment where the right capital allocation and strategic positioning is critical. Coach is on its way to becoming one of the first true American 'fashion conglomerates', with only Michael Kors and L Brands on its heels. |

Select Management Comments

Q1 2019 Earnings Call | October 30th, 2018

"[Of] course, our New York Fashion Week presentation again received praise from the editorial community."

"[We] remain focused first and foremost on execution. As you know, our goal is to deliver strong revenue and operating income growth in fiscal 2019, while making the right strategic investments to support our long term vision and return to double digit operating income and EPS growth in FY 2020. Overall, we are proud of our continued progress in the first quarter and remain very excited about the opportunities ahead for Tapestry and each of our brands."

"Our [new] Data Labs team is focused on [using advanced] data tools to drive aggregate business insights across the organization [and] innovating with advanced analytics to optimize key processes, for example using machine learning on product allocation, pricing or promotion planning."

"We continue to reinforce [Coach] Signature as a coveted brand icon by [...] significantly expanding the platform's reach. In September, we continued our partnership with Selena Gomez launching our new cross category collection."

- Victor Luis, Chief Executive Officer of Tapestry, Inc.

"[We] couldn't be more excited about having Michael B. Jordan as our first global face for the Coach men's and it's currently about 20% business. We've talked before [on] the importance of men's as a driver for total Coach growth of our business and we see a clear path to \$1 billion and beyond."

Joshua Schulman, Chief Executive Officer and Brand President of Coach

3. Company Information

Research Analyst Comments



"TPR's underlying fundamentals appear solid, with Coach brand comps having increased for four consecutive quarters, Kate Spade's turnaround continuing to progress, and Stuart Weitzman remaining on course to return to sales growth in F2Q19."



"Trends at Coach and Kate appear firmly on track, with Kate on pace to deliver positive [results in the near future] and both brands delivering strong gross margin results."

"We continue to see significant synergy opportunity with Kate."

J.P.Morgan

"[Although] Tapestry [has added] to its multi-branded portfolio with a further accretive acquisition, [we expect] brand dilution from outlet distribution, particularly at Kate Spade as it further expands into this channel."



"Stuart Weitzman has had its share of issues – from management turnover to distribution while Kate Spade is undergoing its own turnaround as management works to elevate the brand. Both Acquisitions are a 'wait and see' story."

"TPR's acquisitions of Stuart Weitzman and Kate Spade helped diversify its product mix slightly, but have increased total exposure to the U.S. and to the same accessible luxury market."

Morgan Stanley

"[We remain cautious as] F1Q19 had its puts and takes. Total revenue beat, however, operating results were mixed"



"TPR shares appear to be over-sold on China fears. [We believe that the] valuation [is now] attractive for [this] global brand portfolio with longer-term double digit EPS and free cash flow algorithm."

"[The real question] is when/if investors will start to feel more comfortable on sustainability of China spending..."



"Tapestry is a growth stock with more EPS upside than the market prices in."

"We predict the Coach brand will grow faster and the Kate Spade deal will prove more accretive than the Street believes."

"[Both] Coach and Kate Spade have big China opportunities"

4. Deliverables **DEVELOPMENT PROCESS**

Development Process - Corporate Valuation & Strategic Review

The Corporate Valuation and Strategic Review will be presented in one of first meetings you will have with a new client and must meet all of the following objectives:

- ✓ Demonstrate you understand the company and its industry
- ✓ Present perspectives on the value of the company
- ✓ Introduce actionable corporate finance ideas
- ✓ Showcase capabilities, professionalism and communication skills

Below diagram illustrates the typical steps and topics that need to be covered to secure a mandate.

Company & Industry Research & Analysis

- Financial Forecast
- Business Model
- Market OpportunitiesSupply Chain

- Strategic Objectives
- Capital Structure
- Industry Trends
- Competitive Landscape

How do the company and industry operate?

| į | DCF | Comparables | Precedents | Leveraged Buyout |
|---|---|-------------|---|------------------------------|
| | Intrinsic ValuationUnderstand business | | Relative ValuationM&A Trends | Financial Sponsors Valuation |

What is the company's worth and what is driving its value?

DVIC

Corporate Finance Recommendations

- Capital Raising
- M&A, Joint Ventures
- Vertical Integration
- In-House Expansion

- Capital Structure
- Divestitures
- Horizontal Integration
 Restructuring

How can shareholder value be maximized?

PITCHBOOK

Most critical submission deliverable & selling tool



SECURE CLIENT ADVISORY MANDATE

4. Deliverables ANALYTICAL COMPONENTS (A-F)

Key Steps - Corporate Valuation & Strategic Review

An high-level overview of the purpose of the key components underlying your analysis and recommendations is provided below.

| recommendations is provided below. | |
|--|--|
| Company & Industry Analysis (A) Fundamentals | In order to credibly position yourself for an advisory mandate and have a meaningful discussion senior with management and shareholders, you need to develop a comprehensive understanding of the company and the industry it operates in. |
| Discounted Cashflows (B) Intrinsic Valuation | Your first task will be to forecast financial statements from historical data and public information in order to calculate free cash flows to capital providers and discount them by an appropriate cost of capital. This analysis estimates the present value of the company's cash flows and ensures you have a detailed understanding of the company. |
| Trading Comparables (C) <i>Relative Valuation</i> | You are required to complete a dataset of trading comparables and select the multiples which are the most suitable for valuing Tapestry. Your should also identify current valuation themes including how the market is valuing specific characteristics of companies in the sector. |
| Precedent Transactions (D) Relative Valuation | You will need to discuss relevant precedent transactions in the space and how those relate to the valuation of Tapestry. You are required to identify the appropriate metrics for each transaction and outline how specific transactions and their context might relate to Tapestry. |
| Leveraged Buyout (E) Financial Sponsor Valuation | You are also requested to produce an analysis on the viability and implied share price for a Leveraged Buyout (LBO) and provide some perspectives on the LBO market in the space. |
| Corporate Finance Advice (F) Strategic Recommendations | Your client has emphasized that Tapestry operates in an increasingly competitive environment and that they expect to have an informed discussion on how Tapestry might allocate capital to maximize shareholder value. They also want to understand how shareholders are reacting to Tapestry and other luxury fashion players pursuing external growth opportunities into specific market segments. In preparation for this discussion, you are required to provide an analysis of potential corporate finance transactions from a strategic, financial and operational perspective as well as identify relevant transactions themes in the broader sector. |

4. Deliverables PITCHBOOK CONTENT (H)

Pitchbook Content - Corporate Valuation & Strategic Review

Your pitchbook needs to incorporate all of the information you want to convey to your client including team credentials, model outputs and supporting information in appendices.

The expectation is that your client has to only look at your pitchbook to access all of the information relevant to your pitch and the work you have completed.

THE PITCH BOOK | "All-in-One Selling Tool"

PITCHBOOK CONTENT

COMPANY OVERVIEW

Financial Forecast

Strategic Objectives

Business Model

Capital Requirements

Capital Structure

INDUSTRY OVERVIEW

Market Opportunities

Industry Trends

Competitive Landscape

VALUATION ANALYSIS

Share Price Analysis

Trading Comparables

Precedent Transactions

Discounted Cashflows

Leveraged Buyout

CORPORATE FINANCE ADVICE

Capital Raising

M&A, Divestitures

APPENDICES

RESEARCH & ANALYSIS

VALUATION MODEL

Outputs Summaries

Results Overview

Assumptions Overview

Discounted Cashflow Valuation

Cashflow Forecast

Discount Rate Assumptions

Relative Valuation

Trading Comparables

Precedent Transactions

Analysis of Results

Leveraged Buyout Valuation

Financing Assumptions

Buyer Landscape

STRATEGIC ADVICE

VIDEO PRESENTATION

TEAM CREDENTIALS

(A) COMPANY & INDUSTRY ANALYSIS

A. COMPANY & INDUSTRY ANALYSIS

When you are pitching to a corporate client, you are expected to have done your homework on the company, its key competitors and the industry environment. This is an essential prerequisite to having a meaningful discussion with management and shareholders about strategic corporate finance recommendations. The types of transactions you are proposing typically involve millions (or billions) of dollars changing hands and may have a transformational impact on a company.

Please refer to the separate research guide sent to you for additional instructions.

COMPANY RESEARCH TOPICS

- Financial performance
- Growth rates & margins
- Capital requirements
- Capital structure
- Corporate finance activity
- Shareholder base

- Stock performance
- Key valuation metrics
- Recent news
 - Analyst recommendations
 - Valuation methodologies
 - Volatility & risks

- Strategic objectives
- Business model
- Competitive advantage
- Competitors
- Company history
- Customers & suppliers

INDUSTRY RESEARCH TOPICS

- Market segments
- Key players
- Growth rates & margins
- Capital requirements
- Corporate finance activity
- Sector index performance
- Sector trends
- Valuation methodologies
 - Return on assets
 - Volatility & risks
- Sector value-chain
- Business models
- Competitiveness
- Sector history
- Customers & suppliers

QUICK COMPANY CHECKLIST (complete first draft in < 2-5 hours per company)

Quantitative

- ✓ Revenues and EBITDA
- ✓ Historic & forecasted CAGRs (Revenue, EBITDA)
- ✓ EBIDTA Margin
- ✓ EV and Market Cap
- ✓ EV/EBIDTA, EV/Sales, EV/Volume Metric, P/E
- ✓ Multiples relative to historic & future metrics
- ✓ Debt/EV and Debt/EBITDA
- ✓ Historic and forecasted capital expenditures
- ✓ Stock chart relative to S&P and sector index
- ✓ Analysis of peaks and troughs in stock price
- ✓ WACC, beta
- ✓ Cost of Debt, Credit Rating

Qualitative

- ✓ Major market segments, properties or assets
- ✓ Proportion of revenues from segments / assets
- ✓ Overall market growth and trends by segment
- ✓ Growth due to market, market share, price
- ✓ Business model and supply chain
- ✓ Key competitors and competitive advantage
- ✓ New developments and capacity expansions
- ✓ Capital requirements, return on assets, payback
- ✓ Leverage, refinancing, spin-off, M&A, other
- ✓ Sources of financing
- ✓ Marketing strategy
- ✓ Ownership

INFORMATION SOURCES

- ✓ Annual/Quarterly Reports
 ✓ Financial News
- ✓ Industry Associations
 ✓ Company Initiating Coverage

- ✓ Earnings Calls
- ✓ Data Aggregators ✓ Sector Research
- ✓ Wikipedia
- Research

- Investor Presentations
- ✓ Google
- ✓ Company Earnings Research

(B) DISCOUNTED CASHFLOW VALUATION (Page 1 of 9)

B. Discounted Cashflow Analysis

| DCF Summary - Operating Cashflows | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|-------|------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| | | | | | | | (| Cashflow F | orecast | | | | |
| *All dollar amounts in millions | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019E | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025E | 2026 |
| Coach revenues | 4,806 | 4,192 | 4,147 | 4,115 | 4,222 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Kate Spade revenues | - | - | - | - | 1,285 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Stuart Weizman revenues | = | - | 345 | 374 | 374 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Total Revenues | 4,806 | 4,192 | 4,492 | 4,488 | 5,880 | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Revenue growth | | (12.8%) | 7.2% | (0.1%) | 31.0% | (100.0%) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Coach COGS | (1,509) | (1,283) | (1,298) | (1,260) | (1,290) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Kate Spade COGS | - | - | - | - | (574) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Stuart Weizman COGS | - | - | (142) | (148) | (163) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Total COGS | (1,509) | (1,283) | (1,441) | (1,407) | (2,026) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Coach SG&A | (1,865) | (1,963) | (1,825) | (1,815) | (1,847) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Kate Spade SG&A | - | - | - | - | (773) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Stuart Weizman SG&A | - | - | (170) | (211) | (214) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Corporate SG&A | (312) | (328) | (403) | (268) | (349) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Total SG&A | (2,177) | (2,291) | (2,398) | (2,294) | (3,183) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Coach EBIT | 1,432 | 946 | 1,024 | 1,040 | 1,084 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Kate Spade EBIT | - | - | - | - | (62) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Stuart Weizman EBIT | - | - | 33 | 16 | (3) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Corporate SG&A | (312) | (328) | (403) | (268) | (349) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Total EBIT | 1,120 | 618 | 654 | 787 | 671 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| EBIT growth | | (44.8%) | 5.7% | 20.5% | (14.8%) | (100.0%) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| EBIT margin | 23.3% | 14.7% | 14.5% | 17.5% | 11.4% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Add: Total D&A | 189 | 192 | 211 | 213 | 260 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Add: Stock-based compensation | 84 | 95 | 96 | 77 | 81 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Add: Integration and restructuring activities | 108 | 60 | 18 | 9 | 135 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| EBITDA | 1,501 | 964 | 978 | 1,086 | 1,147 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| EBITDA growth | | (35.8%) | 1.4% | 11.1% | 5.6% | (100.0%) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| EBITDA margin | 31.2% | 23.0% | 21.8% | 24.2% | 19.5% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | _ |

| DCF Summary - Financing Cashflows | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|-------|-------|-------|------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | | | | | | | (| Cashflow F | orecast | | | |
| *All dollar amounts in millions | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019E | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025E | 2026E |
| EBITDA | 1,501 | 964 | 978 | 1,086 | 1,147 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Purchases of PPE | (220) | (199) | (396) | (283) | (267) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Provision for income taxes | (341) | (209) | (166) | (168) | (199) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Working capital and other adjustments | (178) | 175 | (23) | (38) | 111 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Free Cashflows / Cashflows for Debt Service | 763 | 731 | 393 | 597 | 792 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Interest expense | 2 | (6) | (27) | (28) | (74) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Issuance / repayment of long-term debt | 140 | 756 | (15) | 712 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Sale (purchase) of investments | (484) | 106 | (388) | 876 | 478 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Acquisitions | 10 | (515) | (21) | 35 | (2,242) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Cashflow Available for Equity Distributions | 431 | 1,072 | (58) | 2,192 | (1,045) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Equity issuance / repurchase | (525) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Dividends (incl. distributions of cash balance) | (377) | (372) | (375) | (378) | (384) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Net Cashflows | (471) | 700 | (433) | 1,814 | (1,430) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |

| DCF Summary - Valuation Results | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | | | | | | | (| Cashflow F | orecast | | | |
| *All dollar amounts in millions | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019E | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025E | 2026E |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| Enterprise Value EBITDA Multiple Meth | od | Enterprise Value Perpetual Gro | wth Method | WACC Assumptions | |
|---------------------------------------|--------|------------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------|-----------|
| EBITDA multiple | 0.0x | | | - | |
| Terminal year EBITDA | - | | | Valuation date | 31-Jan-19 |
| Revenue muliple | 0.0x | | | 10-yr US government bond rate | 0.0% |
| Terminal year Revenue | - | Perpetual growth of firm cash flov | 0.00% | Expected market return | 0.0% |
| Present value of terminal value | - | Present value of terminal value | - | Market risk premium | 0.0% |
| Present value of forecast FCF | - | Present value of forecast FCF | - | Beta | 0.00 |
| Enterprise Value | - | Enterprise Value | - | CAPM Cost of Equity | 0.0% |
| Debt | - | Debt | - | Cost of debt | 0.0% |
| Cash | - | Cash | - | Tax rate | 0.0% |
| Equity Value (Market Cap) | - | Equity Value (Market Cap) | - | After Tax Cost of Debt | 0.0% |
| Shares outstanding | - | Shares outstanding | - | Target gearing | 0.0% |
| Fair Value Share Price | \$0.00 | Fair Value Share Price | \$0.00 | WACC | 0.0% |

(C) TRADING COMPARABLES VALUATION (Page 1 of 3)

C. Trading Comparables Analysis

| Company Name | Market | Enterprise | Total | Cash & | Revenue | EBITDA | Earnings | Net Debt | / EV/ | Reven | ue ⁽²⁾ | EV | /EBITD | A ⁽²⁾ | P/E | E ⁽²⁾ | EBITDA | CAGR (2) | Revenue | CAGR (2) | EBITDA | WACC |
|--------------------------------|------------|-------------|---------|------------|------------|--------|----------|----------|--------------|--------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|----------|------|
| | Сар. | Value (1) | Debt | S-t Inv. | NTM | NTM | NTM | | LTM | NTM | 2020E | LTM | NTM | 2020E | LTM | NTM | 3-Yr Hist. | 2-Yr Fcst. | 3-Yr Hist. | 2-Yr Fcst. | Margin (| %) |
| (all figures presented in U | ISD millio | ons, except | per sha | re figures | or where r | noted) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Eurpoean Luxury Congi | lomerate | s | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| LVMH | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Kering | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Inditex | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Richemont | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Average | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| American Luxury Congi | lomerate | s | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| L Brands | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Tapestry | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.00 | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Michael Kors | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Average | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Luxury Apparel | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Christian Dior | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Burberry | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Moncler | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Hugo Boss | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Ted Baker | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Average | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Luxury Accessories | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Hermes | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Luxottica | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Swatch Group | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Tiffany & Co. | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Prada | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Pandora Salvatore Ferragamo | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% -% | 0.0x 0.0x | 0.0x 0.0x | 0.0x 0.0x | 0.0x 0.0x | 0.0x 0.0x | 0.0x 0.0x | 0.0x 0.0x | 0.0x 0.0x | -% -% | -% -% | -% -% | -% -% | -% -% | 0.0% |
| Brunello Cucinelli | | | | | | | | -% -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x 0.0x | 0.0x 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% -% | -% | -% -% | -% -% | 0.0% |
| Padini | - | | | | | | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Tod's | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Average | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Luxury Segments Avera | age | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Tapestry | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |

| all figures presented in U Ipscale Brands | Cap. | Value (1) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----------|------------|--------------|----------|------------|-------|-----|----|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|------|------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|---|
| • , | SD millio | | | estm. | NTM | NTM | NTM | EV | LTM | NTM | 2020E | LTM | NTM | 2020E | LTM | NTM | 3-Yr Hist. | 2-Yr Fcst. | 3-Yr Hist. | 2-Yr Fcst. | Margin (% | |
| pscale Brands | | ns, except | per share fi | igures o | r where no | oted) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ommy Hilfiger | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0 |
| alph Lauren Corporation | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0 |
| larks & Spencer | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0 |
| iteve Madden | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0 |
| verage | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0 |
| veryday Brands | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| &M | - | | - | | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | C |
| Sap | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | (|
| merican Eagle | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | (|
| xpress, Inc | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | (|
| verage | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | (|
| thletic Wear | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| like | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0 |
| didas | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | C |
| ululemon Athletica | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | C |
| Inder Armour | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0 |
| verage | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0 |
| ashion Retailers | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| lordstrom | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0 |
| ludson's Bay | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0 |
| arFetch | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | C |
| uckle | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | C |
| Ioni B | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | C |
| verage | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | C |
| elated Segments Aver | age | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0 |
| Sumulative Average | | | | | | | | _ | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.04 | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | C |
| umulauve Average | | | | | | | | _ | U.UX | U.UX | U.UX | U.UX | U.UX | U.UX | U.UX | U.UX | -70 | -70 | -70 | -70 | : -70 | U |
| apestry | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | C |

⁽¹⁾ Enterprise Value is defined as market capitalization, plus total debt and minority interests less cash and short-term investments; ignores equity investments (2) Based on analyst consensus forecasts

(D) PRECEDENT TRANSACTIONS VALUATION (Page 1 of 3)

D. Precedent Transactions

Michael Kors Acquires Versace (2018)

Randa Attempted Acquisition of Perry Ellis (2018)

Michael Kors Acquires Jimmy Choo (2017)

Coach (Tapestry) Acquires Kate Spade (2017)

Semyrhamis Acquires Stake in Christian Dior (2017)

Essilor Acquires Majority Stake in Luxottica (2017)

PFC and Zignago Holding AcquireStake in Hugo Boss (2015)

Coach (Tapestry) Acquires Stuart Weitzman (2015)

Sycamore Acquires The Jones Group (2013)

LVMH Acquires Loro Piana (2013)

Apax Partners Acquires Cole Haan (2012)

PPR (Kering) Acquires Brioni (2011)

Blackstone Acquires Jack Wolfskin (2011)

Eurazeo Acquires Stake in Moncler (2011)


JAB Luxury Acquires Jimmy Choo (2011)

PPR (Kering) Acquires Volcom (2011)

LVMH Acquires Stake in Bulgari (2011)

LVMH Acquires Stake in Bulgari (2011)

Carlyle Acquires Moncler (2008)



| ugo Boss Yes 0.00 Yes <t< th=""><th></th><th></th><th>Combin</th><th>ed Entity</th><th></th><th></th></t<> | | | Combin | ed Entity | | |
|--|---|---------------------|---|-----------|---|-------------------------------|
| Figures presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where otherwise noted) Figures presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where otherwise noted) Figures presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where otherwise noted) Figures presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where otherwise noted) Figures presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where otherwise noted) Figures presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where otherwise noted) Figures presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where otherwise noted) Figures presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where otherwise noted) Figures presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where old on the presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where old on the presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where old on the presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where old on the presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where old on the presented in USD millions, except per share figures or where old on the presented in USD millions, except per share figures or one of the presented in USD millions or one o | | | EV/Revenue | | EV/EBITDA | |
| ersace | Target | Incl.? | LTM | Incl.? | LTM | Relevance to Target Valuation |
| rery Ellis | (all figures presented in USD millions, excep | nt per share figure | es or where otherwise | noted) | | |
| rery Ellis | Vorcee | Voc | 0.00 | Voc | 0.00 | |
| Ves | | | | | | |
| Infisitian Dior Yes 0.00 Yes | | | | | | |
| uxottica | | | | | | |
| ugo Boss Yes 0.00 Yes <t< th=""><th>Luxottica</th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></t<> | Luxottica | | | | | |
| ne Jones Group ror Piana Ves 0.00 Ves 0 | | | | | | |
| Ves | | | | | | |
| Ves | Loro Piana | | | | | |
| rioni | Cole Haan | | | | | |
| Ves | Brioni | | | | | |
| Ves | | | | | | |
| mmy Choo | Moncler | | | | | |
| Ves | Jimmy Choo | | | | | |
| ulgari Yes 0.00 Yes | Volcom | | | | | |
| Ves | Bulgari | | | | | |
| Ves | Bulgari | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Yes | Moncler | | | | | |
| apestry | | | | | | |
| apestry | Average | | 0.0v | t | 0.0v | |
| nplied Enterprise Value otal Enterprise Value - Detx - Preferred & Other + Cash | | | 0.00 | | 0.00 | |
| tal Enterprise Value - Debt - Perferred & Other + Cash | | | | | | |
| - Debt - Preferred & Other + Cash | | | | | | |
| - Preferred & Other + Cash | | | | | | |
| + Cash | | | | | | |
| | + Cash | | | | | |
| guity Value | Equity Value | | | | | |
| | Shares Outstanding (millions) | | h | | <u> </u> | |
| | Fair Value Share Price | | *************************************** | | *************************************** | |

(E) LEVERAGED BUYOUT VALUATION (Page 1 of 2)


E. Leveraged Buyout (LBO) Valuation


| Assumed LBO Transaction Summary | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------|---------|---------|--------------|---------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|-------|---------------------------------|-----------|-------|-------|
| Use of Funds | | | | Source of Fu | unds | | | | | | | |
| Tapestry | - | 0.0% | | Senior Debt | | | | | | | - | -9 |
| Parent Equity Premium (0%) | | 0.0% | | Junior Debt | | | | | | | - | -9 |
| Equity Value | - | -% | | Revolver | | | | | | | - | -9 |
| Debt Retired / Assumed | 1,734 | 100.0% | | Assumed Del | bt | | | | | | - | |
| Transaction Costs | - | 0.0% | | Total Debt | | | | | | | - | - |
| | | | | Sponsor Equi | | | | | | | 491 | 28.3% |
| | | | | Excess Balar | | Cash (Shor | tfall) | | | | 1,243 | 71.7% |
| Total Funds Uses | 1,734 | 100% | | Total Funds | Sources | | | | | | 1,734 | 100 |
| | | | | | | | | | | ansaction | | |
| Equity Cashflows | | | | | | 2019E | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025 |
| Proforma Revenue Forecast | Annual Revenue % Growth | 0.0% | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Revenue & Margin Synergies EBITDA Contribution | Annual Margin Improvement | 0.0% | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Proforma EBITDA Forecast | Average EBITDA Margin | 0.0% | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Cashflow for Debt Service (post Taxes, Capex, & WC) | | | | | | | - | | | - | | |
| Mandatory Debt Service (Interest Expense) | | | | | | | | | _ | _ | _ | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Repayment of LBO Debt | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Operating Cashflow for Equity | | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | |
| LBO Sponsor Equity | | | | | | (491) | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Sales Proceeds (based on 0.0x LTM EBITDA multiple) | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| (-) Exit Transaction Costs | | | Current | \$38.93 | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| (-) Remaining Debt at Exit | | | Offered | \$38.93 | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| (+) Excess Cash | | | Premium | 0% | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| (+) Residual Cash Flows | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Net Equity Cashflows | | | IRR | 0.00% | | (491) | - | - | - | - | - | |
| | | | | | | | | Po | st-LBO Tr | ansaction | | |
| Outstanding Debt Balance | | | | | | 2019E | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025 |
| Senior Debt at 0.0% | | | | | | _ | | - | - | | - | |
| Junior Debt at 0.0% | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Revolver Debt at 0.0% | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Assumed Debt at 0.0% | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Total Debt Ending Balance | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Debt/EBITDA | | | | | | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | N |
| Cashflows for Debt Service / Total Interest Expense | | | | | | 0.0x | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | N |
| Cashflows for Debt Service / Total Interest Expense | | | | | | 0.0x 0.0x | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | N |
| Castillows for Debt Gerwice / Gerilor interest Expense | | | | | | 0.0x | INIVI | INIVI | INIVI | INIVI | INIVI | 141 |
| Detailed LBO Cashflow Summary | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Detailed LDO Cashilow Suninally | | | | | | _ | | | | | | |
| *All dollar amounts in millions | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019E | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025 |
| Standalone Revenues | 4,806 | 4,192 | 4,492 | 4,488 | 5,880 | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Revenue Synergies | - | - | - | - | - | - | | - | - | - | - | |
| Proforma Revenue Forecast | 4,806 | 4,192 | 4,492 | 4,488 | 5,880 | | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | |
| Revenue Growth | 1,000 | (12.8)% | 7.2% | (0.1)% | 31.0% | (100.0)% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.09 |
| | | | | | | (100.0)70 | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.0, |
| Standalone EBITDA | 1,501 | 964 | 978 | 1,086 | 1,147 | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Revenue & Margin Synergies EBITDA Contribution | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Proforma EBITDA Forecast | 1,501 | 964 | 978 | 1,086 | 1,147 | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| EBITDA Margin | 31.2% | 23.0% | 21.8% | 24.2% | 19.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.09 |
| Taxes | (341) | (209) | (166) | (168) | (199) | | | | | | | |
| Capex | (220) | (199) | (396) | (283) | (267) | | | | | | | |
| Change in Working Capital | (178) | 175 | (23) | (38) | 111 | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cashflow for Debt Service (post Taxes, Capex, & WC) | 763 | 731 | 393 | 597 | 792 | - | • | - | • | - | • | |
| Interest Expense on Existing Debt | 2 | (6) | (27) | (28) | (74) | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Senior LBO Debt Interest Expense | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Junior LBO Debt Interest Expense | 2 | (C) | (07) | (20) | (7.1) | | • | | - | - | - | |
| Mandatory Debt Service (Interest Expense) | 2 | (6) | (27) | (28) | (74) | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Debt/EBITDA | | | | | | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | N |
| Cashflows for Debt Service / Total Interest Expense | | | | | | | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | N |
| | | | | | | | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | N |
| Cashflows for Debt Service / Senior Interest Expense | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| · | 765 | 724 | 366 | 569 | 719 | | | | | _ | _ | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | - | - | - | - | _ | | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | - | : | : | - | - | - | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt Residual Cashflow after LBO Debt Service | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | - | - | : | : | - | - | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt Residual Cashflow after LBO Debt Service LBO Purchase | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | - | : | - | - | - | • | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt Residual Cashflow after LBO Debt Service LBO Purchase Excess Cash on Balance Sheet | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | 1,243 | - | • | - | - | - | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt Residual Cashflow after LBO Debt Service LBO Purchase Excess Cash on Balance Sheet Equity Issuance for LBO | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | 1,243 491 | | : | - | • | - | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt Residual Cashflow after LBO Debt Service LBO Purchase Excess Cash on Balance Sheet Equity Issuance for LBO Senior LBO Debt Issuance | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | | - | - | - - - - | - | - | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt Residual Cashfilow after LBO Debt Service LBO Purchase Excess Cash on Balance Sheet Equity Issuance for LBO Senior LBO Debt Issuance Junior LBO Debt Issuance | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | 491 - - | - - - - - - | | - - - - - | - | | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt Residual Cashfilow after LBO Debt Service LBO Purchase Excess Cash on Balance Sheet Equity Issuance for LBO Senior LBO Debt Issuance Junior LBO Debt Issuance LBO Purchase Price | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | | - - - - - - | - | - | | - | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt Residual Cashflow after LBO Debt Service LBO Purchase Equity Issuance for LBO Senior LBO Debt Issuance Junior LBO Debt Issuance LBO Purchase Price Equity IRR Calculation | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | 491 - (1,734) | - - - - - - - - | - | - - - - - - - | - | - | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt Residual Cashflow after LBO Debt Service LBO Purchase Excess Cash on Balance Sheet Equity Issuance for LBO Senior LBO Debt Issuance Junior LBO Debt Issuance Junior LBO Debt Issuance LBO Purchase Price Equity IRR Calculation LBO Sponsor Equity | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | 491 - - | - - - - - - - | | - | - | - | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt Residual Cashflow after LBO Debt Service LBO Purchase Excess Cash on Balance Sheet Equity Issuance for LBO Senior LBO Debt Issuance Junior LBO Debt Issuance LBO Purchase Price Equity IRR Calculation LBO Sponsor Equity Sale Proceeds | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | 491 - (1,734) | - - - - - - - - | | - | | | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt Residual Cashflow after LBO Debt Service LBO Purchase Excess Cash on Balance Sheet Equity Issuance for LBO Senior LBO Debt Issuance Junior LBO Debt Issuance LBO Purchase Price Equity IRR Calculation LBO Sponsor Equity Sasa Transaction Costs (Exit) | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | 491 - (1,734) | - - - - - - - - | | - | - | | |
| Cashflows for Debt Service / Senior Interest Expense FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt Residual Cashflow after LBO Debt Service LBO Purchase Excess Cash on Balance Sheet Equity Issuance for LBO Senior LBO Debt Issuance Junior LBO Debt Issuance LBO Purchase Price Equity IRR Calculation LBO Sponsor Equity Sale Proceeds Transaction Costs (Exit) Repayment of Debt | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | 491 - (1,734) | | - | : | - | | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt Residual Cashflow after LBO Debt Service LBO Purchase Excess Cash on Balance Sheet Equity Issuance for LBO Senior LBO Debt Issuance Junior LBO Debt Issuance Junior LBO Debt Issuance LBO Purchase Price Equity IRR Calculation LBO Sponsor Equity Sale Proceeds Transaction Costs (Exit) Repayment of Debt Excess Cash | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | 491 - (1,734) | | - | | | | |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment Repayment of LBO Debt Residual Cashflow after LBO Debt Service LBO Purchase Excess Cash on Balance Sheet Equity Issuance for LBO Senior LBO Debt Issuance Junior LBO Debt Issuance Junior LBO Debt Issuance LBO Purchase Price Equity IRR Calculation LBO Sponsor Equity Sale Proceeds Transaction Costs (Exit) Repayment of Debt | % | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | 491 - (1,734) | | - | | | | |

(F) CORPORATE FINANCE ADVICE (Page 1 of 2)

F. Corporate Finance Advice

| Luxury Fashion Industry Overview | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|---------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Revenue by Major Segment | | | | | | |
| Accessories | \$118bn | | | | | |
| Apparel | \$75bn | | | | | |
| Beauty | \$52bn | | | | | |
| Hard Luxury | \$32bn | | | | | |
| Other | \$12bn | | | | | |
| Total revenue | \$289bn | | | | | |
| 5-year revenue growth 4.7% | | | | | | |
| Industry Characteristics | | | | | | |
| Total Debt/EBITDA | 2.9x | | | | | |
| EBITDA/Interest Expense | 8.3x | | | | | |
| Average EBITDA margin | 7.7% | | | | | |
| Quick Ratio | 1.4x | | | | | |
| EV/Revenue | 2.0x | | | | | |
| EV/EBITDA | 12.8x | | | | | |
| Global Industry | | | | | | |
| Total revenue 3-year CAGR | 8.1% | | | | | |
| Forecasted 5-year revenue growth | 4.4% | | | | | |





(H) PITCHBOOK SUBMISSION (Page 1 of 2)

H. The Pitchbook

Other than your live discussions in a meeting, the pitchbook is your ultimate selling-tool to convince your client to consider hiring you as a financial advisor. All critical information can and should be conveyed in a **well structured**, **concise and visually appealing** pitchbook with supporting information included in appendices.

Overview of Key Topics



Designates mandatory sections although note that relative emphasis will differ for each pitch

NTRO

Cover Page

Team Profile Slide 1

Table of Contents

Executive Summary 2

PANY

Company Overview

Operating Forecast

Business Model & Objectives

Capital Structure

Ownership

INDUSTRY

Industry Overview & Supply Chain

Market Segments

Competitive Landscape

Industry Trends

NATION

Historical Share Price

Valuation Football Field

Valuation Analysis

DCF Overview

Comparables Overview

Precedents Overview

LBO Overview

DVICE

Strategic Review

Corporate Finance Advice 3

Corporate Finance Industry Activity 4

Appendix I: Model Outputs 5

Appendix II: Team Member Profiles 6

Appendix III Other Supporting Info 7

One-slide team profile (see package attachment)

2 All key conclusions to be immediately apparent

- 3 List and rank 3-5 recommendations on one slide Add one slide per recommendation for at least 3 recommendations with rationale, concerns and high-level expected financial / valuation impact
- 4 List of most likely corporate finance transactions among key competitors
- 5 Model outputs (see package attachment)
- 6 Full team profiles (see package attachment)
- 7 Any relevant info too lengthy for main body

(J) TEAM MEMBER PROFILES SUBMISSION

I. Team Member Profiles

Every team is required to submit updated profiles for each team member in the pitchbook and as separate PDFs.

Evaluation: Please note that personal qualifications will not be used in evaluating your advancement to the Final Round, which is determined based on the quality of your submission. However, your ability to present your team and accomplishments in a polished and professional manner will factor into your overall submission.

Separate CV Submission: Your standard-form one-page CVs will be made accessible to judges and sponsors upon request .



- Please follow our suggested guidelines in Section 3 for writing and refining your CV.
- Include any upcoming future work placements.
- Create and upload one combined PDF (entire team) and one separate PDF per team member (one person).
- Each CV must not take up more than one page per person.
- Upload all CV files in PDF format.

Team Profiles in Pitchbook: Irrespective of your current experience and qualification, it is critical that you and your team present yourself in the pitchbook in a polished and professional manner. This is one of the most important skills for securing a high-profile advisory role and you are encouraged to closely follow the below guidelines.

Profile Photo: Please watch Pitchbooks Chapter 1 on <u>NIBCLive.com</u> for formatting profile pictures. In particular, please limit the excess space above the head for any portrait-style pictures.



- This slide should be added at the <u>beginning</u> of the pitchbook and repeated in the appendix and servers as a general introduction.
- Introduce every team member in a short paragraph-style format.
- Include the most important work experience and personal details.
- Create your own design (do not copy the template like-for-like)



- This slide should be added to the <u>appendix</u> and summarizes key accomplishments of all team members on one slide.
- Follow the template and divide up the information into roles & organizations and accomplishments.
- You may use the template provided (recommend no modifications)



- This slide should be added to the <u>appendix</u> and should include all of the information highlighted in your CV.
- Create one slide per team members.
- You may use the template provided (recommend modifying to include and highlight team-specific experiences)

7. CONTACT US

Competition Inquiries

Please note that NIBC typically does not provide additional guidance on producing the case submission unless some corrections are required to the materials provided. This is to ensure a fair process but also recognizing that this is a real life situation and you are expected to utilize all information and past examples provided to deliver the best submission.

Should you need to get in contact with a team member regarding any queries, please contact the respective representatives below via email and **be sure to copy both individuals on the email**.

Kind regards,

The NIBC Organizing Team

For inquiries about the case and competition rules:

Eric Hall



NIBCAssociate Director, Competition

Eric.Hall@nibc.ca

Mehtaab Chandi



NIBC
Case Manager

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Sofiia Salimova



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Director, Conference

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Maori Hayashi



NIBC
Operations Manager

Maori.Hayashi@nibc.ca

8. Participating School

Select Canadian Universities

















































Select US Universities





















































































Select International Universities

















































9. Sponsors & Partners





Past Participating Firms, Sponsors & Judges















10. NIBC Final Round




Hotel Venue



10. NIBC Final Round



Opening Reception



10. NIBC Final Round



Gala Dinner Final Round



VANCOUVER NEW YORK TORONTO







Morgan Stanley





































































About NIBC

Established in 2007, the National Investment Banking Competition (NIBC) brings together over 1,600 competitors from 150 universities and 150 professionals in an annual transaction advisory competition. NIBC was founded on the guiding principle of giving students from any background an equal opportunity to showcase their skills on a global stage and connect with recruiters from financial centers around the world. Run by a team of dedicated students and with the generous support of corporate sponsors and board members, NIBC has become the first and largest international investment banking competition globally.

Competition & Case Contact Information

The NIBC Organizing Team would like to thank you for your interest in NIBC 2018. For further inquiries, please copy the following contacts:

Eric Hall | Associate Director, Competition | 604.700.4120 | Eric.Hall@nibc.ca Mehtaab Chandi | Case Manager | 778.834.6040 | Mehtaab.Chandi@nibc.ca



Appendix A: Industry Overview


NIBC 2018 Global Competition | First Round




Industry Overview

Luxury Fashion Industry Overview

| Revenue by Major Segment | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Accessories | \$118bn | | | | | |
| Apparel | \$75bn | | | | | |
| Beauty | \$52bn | | | | | |
| Hard Luxury | \$32bn | | | | | |
| Other | \$12bn | | | | | |
| Total revenue | \$289bn | | | | | |
| 5-year revenue growth | 4.7% | | | | | |
| Industry Characteristics | | | | | | |
| Total Debt/EBITDA | 2.9x | | | | | |
| EDITO A /Interest Eventue | | | | | | |
| EBITDA/Interest Expense | 8.3x | | | | | |
| Average EBITDA margin | 8.3x 7.7% | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| Average EBITDA margin | 7.7% | | | | | |
| Average EBITDA margin Quick Ratio | 7.7% 1.4x | | | | | |
| Average EBITDA margin Quick Ratio EV/Revenue | 7.7% 1.4x 2.0x | | | | | |
| Average EBITDA margin Quick Ratio EV/Revenue EV/EBITDA | 7.7% 1.4x 2.0x | | | | | |







Industry Trends





cartier GANN VERS

Trends

- Millennials: The industry is transitioning into a new market where Millennials are contributing to significant portion of sales.
- Digital Media: Marketing through influencers on social media is becoming an increasingly dominant arena for brand development
- Chinese Consumer: Luxury products are in high demand in the Asian markets with mixed impacts from the macroeconomic

Competition

- Brand Acquisition: Quality companies with attractive brands are in strong demand for conglomerates and financial buyers
- Market Share: Potential to expand market share and monopolize profits via acquisition

Regional Characteristics


- Europe: Heart of the luxury fashion, accessories, and jewelry origination markets, and home to major conglomerates and brands
- North America: Less history and symbolism in relation to branding but strong contender via private equity investments
- Asia / International: Strong consumer demand but limited home-grown and owned luxury brands
- **LVMH** (10.6% European luxury conglomerate)
- Kering (4.1% European luxury conglomerate)
- Luxottica (0.02% luxury accessories)
- **Tapestry** (0.01% American luxury conglomerate)
- Michael Kors (0.01% American luxury conglomerate)

Key Players

5-Year Share Price Performance and Notable Events

| | tapestry | LVMH | KERING | MICHAEL KORS | RALPHALAUREN |
|-----------------------|--|--|---|---|--|
| Genre | High-End | Luxury | Luxury | Luxury, High-End, Upscale | Upscale |
| Core Product Focus | Modern luxury and lifestyle | Fully diversified luxury products | Fully diversified luxury products | Accessories, footwear and apparel | Premium lifestyle products |
| Key Brands | Coach, Kate Spade, Stuart Weitzman | Louis Vuitton, Dior, Celine, Marc Jacobs, Givenchy, Fendi, etc | Gucci, Bottega Veneta, Brioni, Yves Saint Laurent, etc | Michael Kors, Jimmy Choo, Versace | Ralph Lauren, Club Monaco |
| Geography | North America (59%) Asia (24%) Other (17%) | North America (23%) Europe (28%) Asia (37%) Other (12%) | North America (19%) Europe (35%) Asia (40%) Other (6%) | North America (64%) Europe (23%) Asia (13%) | North America (56%) Europe (40%) Asia (3%) Other (1%) |
| CEO | Victor Luis | Bernard Arnault | François-Henri Pinault | John Idol | Patrice Louvet |
| Headquarters | New York City | Paris | Paris | New York City | New York City |
| Recent Events | Recently acquired Kate Spade | Bought remaining interest in Christian Dior brand | Sold Puma back to original shareholders | Recently acquired Versace | Closed flagship store on Fifth Avenue, New York City |

Corporate Finance Activity



Recent Brand Acquisitions





Recent Transactions in Luxury Segment

Tapestry acquires Kate Spade (\$2.78bn)


Michael Kors successfully bids for Versace (\$2.2bn)

LVMH acquires remaining interest in Christian Dior (\$10.6bn)

Michael Kors acquires Jimmy Choo (\$1.39bn)

Tapestry Share Price Performance

5-Year Share Price Performance and Notable Events



- January 2015 Tapestry announced \$570m cash agreement to acquire Stuart Weitzman Intermediate LLC
- May 2017 Tapestry announced \$2.4bn all cash tender offer to acquire Kate Spade & Company
- Oct 2017 Rebrands company from Coach to Tapestry to reflect diversified brand portfolio resulting from M&A

Luxury Segment Share Price Performance

5-Year Share Price of Key Competitors



Source: Capital IQ

Company Profile: Tapestry

Tapestry, Inc

tapestry

| History | Operations |
|---|---|
| The company's namesake brand, Coach, was founded in 1941 out of a family-run workshop in a Manhattan workshop Has since grown into a multinational holding company for luxury fashion houses Coach, Kate Spade, and Stuart Weitzman | Operates three core brands: Coach, Stuart Weitzman, and Kate Spade Sells products through Tapestry operated stores, wholesale, online, and third-party distributors / licensers Fun fact: Coach branded women's handbags account for 39% of revenue |
| Select Financial Stats | Business Strategy |
| Exchange / Ticker: NYSE / TPR Stock Price: \$38.93 Market Capitalization: \$11.46bn Revenue: \$5.9bn; Gross Profit: \$3.9bn; EBITDA: \$1.2bn Total Debt: \$1.6bn; Cash: \$1.0bn EV/EBITDA: 10.2x; EV/Revenue: 2.0x | Diversification through M&A – have acquired both Stuart Weitzman and Kate Spade brands to gain market share Moderately grow retail presence with a focus on mainland China and Europe Use the data analytics to drive retail and department store traffic, with an ecommerce platform integrated into the retail experience |
| Select Corporate Finance Transactions | Structure |
| Acquired Kate Spade (2017): \$2.4bn | Reported revenue in 2018 through three business segments: |
| Acquired Stuart Weitzman (2015): \$574m | ■ Coach (72%) |
| | Kate Spade (22%) |
| | Stuart Weitzman (6%) |
| Source: Capital IQ as of November 30, 2018; Tapestry 2018 Annual Report | |

National Investment Banking Competition & Conference 2018 | Highly Confidential and Privileged

Company Profile: LVMH

LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton S.E.

LVMH

| History | Operations |
|---|---|
| LVMH was formed by the merger of fashion house Louis Vuitton and wine and spirits producer Moët Hennessy in 1987 With M&A history stretching as far back as the 80's, LVMH has come to own and operate exclusive brands across all luxury segments | Operates five core business groups: Wines & Spirits, Fashion & Leather Goods, Perfumes & Cosmetics, Watches & Jewelry, and Selective Retailing |
| Select Financial Stats | Business Strategy |
| Exchange / Ticker: EPA / MC Stock Price: €252.55 Market Capitalization: €126.84bn Revenue: €44.67bn; Gross Profit: €29.64bn; EBITDA: €10.90bn Total Debt: €12.37bn; Cash: €4.96bn EV/EBITDA: 12.4x; EV/Revenue: 3.0x | Focus on organic growth and invests heavily in their brands Both upstream and downstream vertical integration enabling control over the entire value chain (protecting brand image) Heavy diversification to ensure stable profits and shareholder return |
| Select Corporate Finance Transactions | Structure |
| Acquired Christian Dior Couture S.A. (2017): \$7bn Purchased 80% stake in Rimowa (2016): \$716m Purchased 42% stake in Repossi (2015): Undisclosed | Reported revenue in 2017 through the following business segments: Fashion & Luxury Goods (36%) Selective Retailing (30%) |

Perfume & Cosmetics (13%) Wines & Spirits (12%) Watches & Jewelry (9%)

Source: Capital IQ as of November 30, 2018; LVMH 2017 Annual Report

Acquired Bulgari (2011): \$5.2bn

Company Profile: Kering

Kering SA

KERING



| History | Operations |
|---|---|
| Founded in 1963 by François Pinault as a timber trading company Transitioned to luxury goods in 1999, purchasing a 42% stake in Gucci Group with further acquisitions in later years | Three core brands (Gucci, Bottega Veneta, and Saint Laurent) represent over 50% of revenue Operates in all international markets through traditional retail and e-commerce |
| Select Financial Stats | Business Strategy |
| Exchange / Ticker: EPA / KER Stock Price: €384.00 Market Capitalization: €48.41bn Revenue: €16.84bn; Gross Profit: €11.24bn; EBITDA: €4.13bn Total Debt: €4.72bn; Cash: €1.93bn EV/EBITDA: 12.4x; EV/Revenue: 3.0x | Strong focus on in-store organic sales growth – increasing sales per square meter with new concepts and unique storytelling Leverage social media through the GucciApp and #GucciGram Continue to build e-commerce platform (86% growth for Gucci sales) alongside their refocus on becoming a luxury pure player |
| Select Corporate Finance Transactions | Structure |
| Acquiring Stella McCartney (2018): Undisclosed PUMA spin-off (2018): \$4.5bn | Reported revenue in 2017 through two business segments: Luxury (71%) |

Sports & Lifestyle (29%)

Source: Capital IQ as of November 30, 2018; Kering SA 2017 Annual Report

Sold 1,500sqm retail property (2017): Undisclosed

Sold Kering Eyewear (2017): Undisclosed

Sold Sergio Rossi (2017): \$65.9m

Company Profile: Michael Kors

Michael Kors Holdings Limited



| History | Operations |
|---|---|
| Founded by designer Michael Kors in 1990 as a licensee of Bergdorf Goodman Went bankrupt in 1990 but remerged in 2003 after a \$100m investment Completed IPO at \$3.4bn valuation on the NYSE in 2011 | Offer four primary collections: Michael Kors Collection, MICHAEL Michael Kors, Michael Kors Men, and Jimmy Choo Primary revenue generation is through retail and wholesale operations Preparing corporate rebrand as Capri Holdings after Versace acquisition |
| Select Financial Stats | Business Strategy |
| Exchange / Ticker: NYSE / KORS Stock Price: \$43.75 Market Capitalization: \$6.57bn Revenue: \$5.07bn; Gross Profit: \$3.10bn; EBITDA: \$1.16bn Total Debt: \$759m; Cash: \$155m EV/EBITDA: 6.2x; EV/Revenue: 1.4x | Dependent on trendsetting and innovation – unique design and style is the key differentiator in the luxury fashion industry Brand engagement through product placement is a core marketing strategy – leveraged celebrities through red carpet product placement and social media campaigns Asia market penetration – Jimmy Choo acquisition to help drive growth |
| Select Corporate Finance Transactions | Structure |
| Acquired Gianni Versace S.p.A. (2018): \$2.1bn Acquired Jimmy Choo Group Plc. (2017): \$1.3bn | Reported revenue in 2018 through four business segments: MK Retail (57.5%) |

MK Wholesale (34.7%) Jimmy Choo (4.7%)

■ MK Licensing (3.1%)

Source: Capital IQ as of November 30, 2018; Michael Kors Holdings Limited 2018 Annual Report

Share buyback (2017): \$1.0bn

Share buyback (2016): \$1.0bn Share buyback (2014): \$1.6bn

Company Profile: Ralph Lauren

Ralph Lauren Corporation



| History | Operations |
|--|--|
| Founded by designer Ralph Lauren in 1967 by creating men's ties in New York City IPO'ed on the NYSE in 1997 Ralph Lauren and his family retain 83% of voting shares | Producer and distributor of mid range to luxury products Uses wholesale, retail and licensing deals to generate revenue Merchandise is available in over 13,000 stores worldwide |
| Select Financial Stats | Business Strategy |
| Exchange / Ticker: NYSE / RL Stock Price: \$111.40 Market Capitalization: \$8.96bn Revenue: \$6.25bn; EBITDA: \$962mm Total Debt: \$8.26bn; Cash: \$384mm EV/EBITDA: 8.4x; EV/Revenue: 1.3x | Strategy shift to focus on e-commerce verses traditional brick and mortar Shut down Firth Avenue flagship store in New York City Heavily investing in Salesforce e-commerce platform Further segmentation of mid range clientele from luxury clientele – luxury brand only available through premier retail outlets |
| Select Corporate Finance Transactions | Structure |

| Select Corporate Finance Transactions | Structure |
|---|--|
| Share buyback (2018): \$1bn | Reported revenue in 2017 through four business segments: |
| Share buyback (2014): \$2.5bn | North America (57%) |
| Acquired Impact 21 (2007): \$346mm | Europe (23%) |
| Acquired Ralph Lauren Media LLC (2007): \$175mm | Asia (13%) |
| Acquired Sun Apparel (2005): \$355mm | Other (7%) |

Source: Capital IQ as of November 30, 2018; Ralph Lauren Corporation 2017 Annual Report

NIBC 2018-2019 First Round Case Tapestry

Appendix B: Precedent Transactions

Contents

Michael Kors Acquires Versace (Sep 25, 2018)

Randa Attempted Acquisition of Perry Ellis (Jul 02, 2018)

Michael Kors Acquires Jimmy Choo (Jul 25, 2017)

Coach (Tapestry) Acquires Kate Spade (May 08, 2017)

Semyrhamis Acquires Additional 25.7% Stake in Christian Dior (Apr 25, 2017)

Essilor Acquires Majority Stake in Luxottica (Jan 16, 2017)

PFC and Zignago Holding Acquires 7.2% Stake in Hugo Boss (Feb 10, 2015)

Coach (Tapestry) Acquires Stuart Weitzman (Jan 6, 2015)

Sycamore Acquires The Jones Group (Dec 19, 2013)

LVMH Acquires Loro Piana (Jul 8, 2013)

Apax Partners Acquires Cole Haan (Nov 16, 2012)

PPR (Kering) Acquires Brioni (Jul 29, 2011)

Blackstone Acquires Jack Wolfskin (Jul 21, 2011)

Eurazeo Acquires 45% Stake in Moncler (Jun 6, 2011)

JAB Luxury Acquires Jimmy Choo (May 22, 2011)

PPR (Kering) Acquires Volcom (May 2, 2011)

LVMH Acquires 50.43% Stake in Bulgari (Mar 6, 2011)

LVMH Acquires 49.57% Stake in Bulgari (Mar 6, 2011)

Carlyle Acquires Moncler (Aug 5, 2008)

FIRST ROUND CASE EXCERPTS - FOR PREVIEW ONLY Please sign up a team at www.nibc.ca for full technical guidance & templates

Please note all supplied IEV and LTM figures are in USD.

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Precedent Transactions

Michael Kors Acquires Versace (Sep 25, 2018)

Michael Kors Holdings Limited (NYSE:KORS) signed a definitive agreement to acquire all of the outstanding shares of Gianni Versace S.p.A. from Versace family, Borgo Luxembourg S.à r.l., Blackstone GPV Capital Partners (Mauritius) VI-D FDI Ltd., Blackstone GPV Tactical Partners (Mauritius)—N Ltd. and manages of Gianni Versace for an enterprise value of approximately €1.8 billion on September 24, 2018. The purchase price is subject to certain adjustments, including, subject to limited exceptions, reductions for any liabilities of Gianni Versace as of the closing and for dividends, distributions or other payments made by Versace during the period beginning on July 1, 2018 through the closing. The deal value is primarily in cash with €150 million of the consideration to be paid in shares. In addition, €100 million of the purchase price that would otherwise be payable at the closing to the Versace Parties will be placed in an escrow account to secure certain indemnification obligations of sellers. Concurrent to the transaction, Versace Parties will reinvest an aggregate of €150 million of the cash received in Gianni Versace. Following acquisition, Donatella Versace, Santo Versace and Allegra Versace Beck will become shareholders in Michael Kors Holdings. The cash portion of the purchase price is expected to be funded by a combination of cash on hand, drawings under the company's existing revolving credit facility, and committed underwritten bank term loans from JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and Barclays. Pursuant to debt commitment letter, JPMorgan Chase Bank and Barclays Bank have committed to arrange and provide Michael Kors a senior unsecured term loan facility in an aggregate principal amount of \$1.6 billion (€1.359 billion), to the extent that certain amendments are not obtained under the Michael Kors existing credit facilities prior to the closing of the acquisition, a \$1 billion (€849.5 million) backstop senior unsecured revolving credit facility. The proceeds will be used for the acquisition and to fund the refinancing of Versace's existing debt and credit facilities. Capri Holdings Limited (NYSE:CPRI) is the new name to be adopted by Michael Kors Holdings Limited upon the closing of the transaction.

Versace's management team will continue to be led by Chief Executive Officer, Jonathan Akeroyd. Donatella Versace agreed to serve as Chief Creative Director for Versace for an additional five-year term following deal completion. The transaction is subject to specified closing conditions, including the approval of all of the antitrust authorities. The transaction is not subject to a financing condition. As of October 18, 2018, the Federal Trade Commission approved the deal. As of November 8, 2018, European Commission has approved the deal. The transaction is expected to close in the company's fourth fiscal quarter of 2019. Michael Kors Holdings believes that the acquisition of Versace enhances the company's economic value and will drive improved long-term shareholder value by accelerating long-term revenue and EPS growth potential. On a non-GAAP basis the acquisition is expected to be dilutive to earnings per share in the high-single digits in fiscal 2020, accretive in the low-single digits in fiscal 2021, and accretive in the high-single digits in fiscal 2022.

Implied Enterprise Value: \$2,154.21

Buyer Description

Michael Kors Holdings Limited design, markets, distributes, and retails branded women's and men's apparel and accessories. It operates in four segments: MK Retail, MK Wholesale, MK Licensing, and Jimmy Choo. The MK Retail segment sells women's apparel; handbags and small leather goods; men's apparel; footwear; and licensed products comprising watches, jewelry, fragrances, and beauty and eyewear. It operates collection stores and lifestyle stores, including concessions and outlets. As of March 31, 2018, this segment operated 379 Michael Kors retail stores, including concessions in the United States and Canada (North America), and Latin America (the Americas); and 450 international retail stores, including concessions in Europe and Asia, as well as e-commerce sites in North America, Canada, Europe, China, Japan, and South Korea. The MK Wholesale segment sells handbags and small leather goods; footwear; and women's and men's apparel to department stores and specialty shops in the Americas, Europe, and Asia. The MK Licensing segment licenses its trademarks to third parties to operate retail stores and/or sell the its products in Brazil, the Middle East, South Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Australia. The Jimmy Choo segment sells luxury footwear, handbags, and small leather goods through directly operated Jimmy Choo stores in North America; Europe, the Middle East, and Africa; and Asia, as well as through Jimmy Choo e-commerce sites. It is also involved in the wholesale distribution activities to partners, multi-brand department stores, and specialty stores worldwide; and licensing agreements related to the manufacture and sale of fragrance, sunglasses, and eyewear. As of March 31, 2018, this segment operated 629 wholesale doors. The

company sells its products under the names of MICHAEL KORS, MICHAEL MICHAEL KORS, JIMMY CHOO, and various other trademarks and logos. Michael Kors Holdings Limited was founded in 1981 and is based in London,

the United Kingdom.

| Revenue: | \$4,258m |
|-------------|----------|
| EBITDA: | \$1,013m |
| EBIT: | \$827m |
| Net Income: | \$560m |

| Debt: | \$704r |
|------------------------|-------------|
| Cash and Cash Equivale | nts: \$146r |
| | ***** |
| | |

Target Description

Gianni Versace S.p.A. manufactures and distributes clothes and accessories for men and women. The company offers bags, shoes, pens, eyewear, fragrances, watches, jewelry, and home products. It sells products online, as well as through its stores and boutiques in Europe, the Russian Federation and Central Asia, the Middle East, the Asia Pacific and Australia, China Mainland, Japan, the United States, Canada, and Central and South America. The company was founded in 1978 and is based in Milan, Italy. Gianni Versace S.p.A. operates as a subsidiary of GIVI Holding S.p.A.



Appendix C: Team Profile Templates

NIBC 2018 Global Competition | First Round



Team Introduction



James Huang

James is in his third year at the University of British Columbia. He will be joining Macquarie Capital as an incoming Summer Analyst in Calgary. James is an Analyst for the Association of Canadian Intercollegiate Investment Clubs (ACIIC) and previously worked for the Corporate Finance Institute. He has worked in fine-dining at two of the most high-end restaurants in

James.Huang@nibc.ca +1 (778) 865-9319 Vancouver, Canada

Education

Vancouver.

 University of British Columbia (Bachelor, 3rd Year Finance)

Key Experiences

- Macquarie Capital, Calgary (Incoming Summer Analyst)
- Corporate Finance Institute, Vancouver (Summer Analyst)



Maori Hayashi

Maori is a third-year student at the University of British Columbia. She worked as a summer analyst at M&A Cloud, an advisory firm focusing on small to mid-sized businesses and will be joining Citigroup as incoming Summer Analyst in Tokyo. Maori played competitive basketball in Japan and placed 3rd in the Osaka City Marathon.

Maori.Hayashi@nibc.ca +1 (778) 710-2392 Vancouver Canada

Education

 University of British Columbia (Bachelor, 3rd Year Finance)

Key Experiences

- Citigroup, Tokyo (Incoming Summer Analyst)
- M&A Cloud, Tokyo (Summer Analyst)



Tennille Robertson

Tennille is in her third year at the University of British Columbia. She has interned within Canaccord Genuity's Wealth Management and corporate finance team supporting advisory and IPO financings. Tennille cofounded an events group and is a former competitive athlete on the BC provincial track & field and basketball team.

Tennille.Robertson@nibc.ca +1 (604) 671-0593 Vancouver Canada

Education

 University of British Columbia (Bachelor, 3rd Year Finance)

Key Experiences

- CanaccordGenuity, Vancouver (Wealth Management & Advisory)
- Events Media Group, Vancouver (Founding Member)



Nina Erdevicki

Nina is in her second year at the University of British Columbia. She most recently completed an internship at Gravitas Securities focusing on early-stage and mature technology clients. Nina competed nationally in women's tennis and was ranked 1st in BC and 7th in Canada and is currently competing for the UBC women's tennis team.

Nina.Erdevicki@nibc.ca +1 (778) 836-4191 Vancouver Canada

Education

 University of British Columbia (Bachelor, 2nd Year Finance)

Key Experiences

- Gravitas Securities, Vancouver (Summer Analyst)
- Professional Tennis (Ranked 1st in BC / 7th in Canada)

IMPORTANT NOTICE: These team profile examples are provided to NIBC competitors to assist with their submission and may not be shared externally. Thank You.

Team Member Accomplishments

EXPERIENCES

SKILLS & ACHIEVEMENTS



James Huang (Undergrad | Finance 2020)

- Macquarie Capital (Calgary): Incoming IB Summer Analyst
- Corporate Finance Institute: Research Analyst
- ACIIC: Research Analyst
- Fine Dining: CinCin Ristorante & Bar, Minami Restaurant

Corporate Finance, Investment Research, Hospitality Operation

- Published reports on Henry Hub, National Balancing Point, AECO
- Oversaw dining service and front-of-house / back-of-house systems
- 4.20/4.33 Cumulative GPA for years 1 & 2, financial modeling training
- Best Player (Basketball), 1st in Regional 4x100m Relay / Discus Throw



Maori Hayashi (Undergrad | Finance 2020)

- Citigroup (Tokyo): Incoming IB Summer Analyst
- M&A Cloud: Analyst, Mid-Market Advisory
- Prime Focus World: Accounting Assistant, Film & Visual Effects
- Young Investor Program: Director, Sponsorships

Corporate Finance, Accounting, Sponsorship

- Invited speakers & sponsors and coached workshops for YI Program
- Equity research (Bloomberg Certificate), Valuation modeling training
- **85% GPA** in 2nd Year, **Piano** (Yamaha Music Foundation: Japan)
- 3rd in City Marathon (Osaka Japan), Regional basketball (Vice-Captain)



Tennille Robertson (Undergrad | Finance 2020)

- Canaccord Genuity: Wealth Management, Advisory
- Community: Free the Children, Events Media Group (Founder)
- Upstat Marketing: Sales Consultant
- Kappa Kappa Gamma Sorority: Marshal Associate

Wealth Management, Professional Events, Direct Sales

- Research for M&A and IPO investment strategies
- Raised \$100,000+ in funds for WE Free the Children public initiatives
- Exceeded sales target for 100% commission-based door-to-door sales
- 97th percentile PSAT Math, 3rd in Provincial Basketball (Captain)



Nina Erdevicki (Undergrad, Finance 2021)

- Gravitas Securities: IB Summer Analyst
- Canadian National Tennis: Professional Competitor
- Community: Help Change My City, The Surrey Project (Leader)
- Erdevicki Structural Engineering: Administrative Assistant

Corporate Finance, High-Performance Competition, Leadership

- Raised sponsorship for Black Dress Fashion Gala at Fairmont (500+)
- Co-founder, workshop leader and web developer for community project
- 6-time Canadian Tennis Nationals Competitor, 1st in BC / 7th in Canada
- International Tennis Federation competing in North America, Europe, Asia

IMPORTANT NOTICE: These team profile examples are provided to NIBC competitors to assist with their submission and may not be shared externally. Thank You.

Nina Erdevicki | Associate, Competition



+1 (778) 836-4191 Nina.Erdevicki@nibc.ca Vancouver, Canada

Education & Skills

- Bachelor of Commerce (UBC)
 Finance Specialization, 2nd Year
- Other Education & Skills Training
 Financial Modeling
 Corporate Finance Research
 High-Performance Tennis
 Web Development & Marketing

Awards & Achievements

- Ranked 1st in BC & 7th in Canada Canadian Tennis Ranking
- Competed in Europe, Asia, & America International Tennis Federation
- "STEM" TELUS Panel Speaker Science, Tech, Engineering, Math
- 2018 Mayoral Campaign Supported runner-up Ken Sim
- Associate, Competition NIBC 2018 Organizing Team

Professional Experience

Gravitas Securities Vancouver, Canada Summer 2018

- Completed investment banking summer internship and directly supported Canadian Head of Capital Markets covering Canadian and US clients as-fully licensed broker
 - Assisted with pitchbook creation, contract due diligence and financial research
 - Worked on two financing engagements involving earlystage and mid-size technology clients
 - Awarded internship during first year and received return offer with high performance ranking



National Investment Banking Competition

Vancouver, Toronto, New York 2018-Present

- NIBC runs the largest investment banking competition globally with 2,000+ competitors and 17 investment banks
- Selected by senior board member and investment banking professionals to join team as only first year
 - Asked to moderate fireside chat with Ken Sim, EY
 Entrepreneur of the Year, who I also assisted in a very close 2018 Vancouver mayoral campaign



International Tennis Federation & Tennis Canada

2012-2017

2016-2017

- Competed in International Tennis Federation (ITF) tournaments in North America, Europe, Asia, and Canada
- Maintained first place ranking in British Columbia for junior high performance tennis from 2012-2016
- Competed in Nationals 6 times and attained top Canadian National Ranking of 7th in Canada.



Help Change my City Vancouver, Canada

- Help Change my City & the Surrey Project are philanthropic endeavors to help marginalized youth in Vancouver
- Co-Founder, Marketing Executive & Workshop Leader
 - Helped organize two Little Black Dress Gala's in Fairmont hotels with 500+ attendees.
 - Led workshops and mentored troubled youth and participated in step-by-step support system





Appendix D: Model Output Templates

NIBC 2018 Global Competition | First Round



Discounted Cashflow Valuation | Operating Cashflows (1/5)

| DCF Summary - Operating Cashflows | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|-------|------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | | | | | | (| Cashflow F | orecast | | | | |
| *All dollar amounts in millions | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019E | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025E | 2026E |
| Coach revenues | 4,806 | 4,192 | 4,147 | 4,115 | 4,222 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Kate Spade revenues | - | - | - | - | 1,285 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Stuart Weizman revenues | - | - | 345 | 374 | 374 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Total Revenues | 4,806 | 4,192 | 4,492 | 4,488 | 5,880 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Revenue growth | | (12.8%) | 7.2% | (0.1%) | 31.0% | (100.0%) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Coach COGS | (1,509) | (1,283) | (1,298) | (1,260) | (1,290) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Kate Spade COGS | - | - | - | - | (574) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Stuart Weizman COGS | - | - | (142) | (148) | (163) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Total COGS | (1,509) | (1,283) | (1,441) | (1,407) | (2,026) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Coach SG&A | (1,865) | (1,963) | (1,825) | (1,815) | (1,847) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Kate Spade SG&A | - | - | - | - | (773) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Stuart Weizman SG&A | - | - | (170) | (211) | (214) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Corporate SG&A | (312) | (328) | (403) | (268) | (349) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Total SG&A | (2,177) | (2,291) | (2,398) | (2,294) | (3,183) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Coach EBIT | 1,432 | 946 | 1,024 | 1,040 | 1,084 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Kate Spade EBIT | - | - | - | - | (62) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Stuart Weizman EBIT | - | - | 33 | 16 | (3) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Corporate SG&A | (312) | (328) | (403) | (268) | (349) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Total EBIT | 1,120 | 618 | 654 | 787 | 671 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| EBIT growth | | (44.8%) | 5.7% | 20.5% | (14.8%) | (100.0%) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| EBIT margin | 23.3% | 14.7% | 14.5% | 17.5% | 11.4% | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Add: Total D&A | 189 | 192 | 211 | 213 | 260 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Add: Stock-based compensation | 84 | 95 | 96 | 77 | 81 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Add: Integration and restructuring activities | 108 | 60 | 18 | 9 | 135 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| EBITDA | 1,501 | 964 | 978 | 1,086 | 1,147 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| EBITDA growth | | (35.8%) | 1.4% | 11.1% | 5.6% | (100.0%) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| EBITDA margin | 31.2% | 23.0% | 21.8% | 24.2% | 19.5% | _ | _ | - | _ | _ | - | - | _ |

Discounted Cashflow Valuation | Segmented Operating Metrics (2/5)

| DCF Summary - Segmented Operating Metrics | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---------|--------|---------|---------|----------|-------|------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | | | | | | (| Cashflow F | orecast | | | | |
| *All dollar amounts in millions | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019E | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025E | 2026E |
| Total Revenue Growth | | (12.8%) | 7.2% | (0.1%) | 31.0% | (100.0%) | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| Coach Revenue Growth | | (12.8%) | (1.1%) | (0.8%) | 2.6% | (100.0%) | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| Kate Spade Revenue Growth | | -% | -% | -% | -% | (100.0%) | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| Stuart Weizman Revenue Growth | | -% | -% | 8.4% | 0.1% | (100.0%) | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| Coach % of Total Revenues | | 100.0% | 92.3% | 91.7% | 71.8% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| Kate Spade % of Total Revenues | | -% | -% | -% | 21.8% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| Stuart Weizman % of Total Revenues | | -% | 7.7% | 8.3% | 6.4% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| Total EBIT Growth | | (44.8%) | 5.7% | 20.5% | (14.8%) | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| Coach EBIT Growth | | (33.9%) | 8.3% | 1.5% | 4.3% | (100.0%) | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| Kate Spade EBIT Growth | | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| Sturat Weizman EBIT Growth | *************************************** | -% | -% | (52.3%) | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| Total EBIT Margin | | 14.7% | 14.5% | 17.5% | 11.4% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| Coach EBIT Margin | | 22.6% | 24.7% | 25.3% | 25.7% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| Kate Spade EBIT Margin | | -% | -% | -% | (4.8%) | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| Stuart Weizman EBIT Margin | | -% | 9.4% | 4.1% | (0.7%) | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| EBITDA Growth | | (35.8%) | 1.4% | 11.1% | 5.6% | (100.0%) | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |
| EBITDA Margin | | 23.0% | 21.8% | 24.2% | 19.5% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% |

Discounted Cashflow Valuation | Financing Cashflow (3/5)

| DCF Summary - Financing Cashflows | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|----|-------|----|---------|-----|--------|----|---------|----|--------|----|-------|----------|-------|----|-------|-----|-------|-------|-------|----|-------|------------|-------|----|-------|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Cas | hflow | v For | ecast | | | | | | |
| *All dollar amounts in millions | | 2014 | | 2015 | | 2016 | | 2017 | | 2018 | | 2019E | = | 2020E | | 2021E | : : | 2022E | : : | 2023E | : | 2024E | : | 2025E | 2 | 2026E |
| EBITDA | | 1,501 | | 964 | | 978 | | 1,086 | | 1,147 | | | - | - | • | | | | | - | | | | - | | |
| Purchases of PPE | | (220) | | (199) | | (396) | | (283) | | (267) | | | - | - | | | | | • | - | | | - | - | | |
| Provision for income taxes | | (341) | | (209) | | (166) | | (168) | | (199) | | | - | - | | | | | • | - | | | - | - | | |
| Working capital and other adjustments | | (178) | | 175 | | (23) | | (38) | | 111 | | | - | - | - | | - | - | • | - | | | - | - | | |
| Free Cashflows / Cashflows for Debt Service | | 763 | | 731 | | 393 | | 597 | | 792 | | | - | - | • | | • | | • | - | | | • | - | | |
| Interest expense | | 2 | | (6) | | (27) | | (28) | | (74) | | | - | - | | | | | • | - | | | - | - | | |
| Issuance / repayment of long-term debt | | 140 | | 756 | | (15) | | 712 | | - | | | - | - | | | | | • | - | | | - | - | | |
| Sale (purchase) of investments | | (484) | | 106 | | (388) | | 876 | | 478 | | | - | - | | | | | • | - | | | - | - | | |
| Acquisitions | | 10 | | (515) | | (21) | | 35 | (2 | 2,242) | | | - | - | | | | | • | - | | | - | - | | |
| Cashflow Available for Equity Distributions | | 431 | | 1,072 | | (58) | | 2,192 | (| 1,045) | | | - | - | • | | | | | - | | | | - | | |
| Equity issuance / repurchase | | (525) | | - | | - | | - | | - | | | - | - | | | | | • | - | | | - | - | | |
| Dividends (incl. distributions of cash balance) | | (377) | | (372) | | (375) | | (378) | | (384) | | | - | - | | | • | | • | - | | | - | - | | |
| Net Cashflows | | (471) | | 700 | | (433) | | 1,814 | (| 1,430) | | | - | - | • | | • | | • | - | | | | - | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ending Cash Balance | | 592 | | 1,292 | | 859 | | 2,673 | | 1,243 | | | - | - | • | | | | | - | | | | - | | |
| Ending Debt Balance | | 141 | | 1,037 | | 1,022 | | 1,734 | | 1,734 | | 1,734 | 4 | 1,734 | ļ | 1,734 | ļ | 1,734 | l | 1,734 | , | 1,734 | ı | 1,734 | | 1,734 |
| Ending Net Debt Balance | | (451) | | (255) | | 163 | | (939) | | 491 | | 1,734 | 4 | 1,734 | ļ | 1,734 | ļ | 1,734 | l | 1,734 | | 1,734 | Į. | 1,734 | | 1,734 |
| Adjusted Interest Expense (for debt sizing only) | | | | 6 | | 27 | | 28 | | 74 | | | - | - | - | - | | - | - | - | • | | - | - | | • |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Net Debt to EBITDA | | - | | (0.3 x) | | 0.2 x | | (0.9 x) | | 0.4 x | | | - | - | | - | | - | | - | | | | - | | - |
| EBITDA / Notional Interest Expense | | - | 1 | 150.6 x | 3 | 36.3 x | | 38.2 x | | 15.5 x | | | • | - | | - | | - | • | - | | | • | - | | - |
| Basic shares outstanding (millions) | | 278 | | 276 | | 278 | | 281 | | 285 | | 285 | 5 | 285 | | 285 | | 285 | | 285 | | 285 | ·········· | 285 | | 285 |
| Diluted shares outstanding (millions) | | 280 | | 277 | | 279 | | 283 | | 289 | | 289 | 9 | 289 |) | 289 |) | 289 |) | 289 | | 289 |) | 289 | | 289 |
| Diluted adjusted earnings (loss) per share | \$ | 2.79 | \$ | 1.45 | \$ | 1.65 | \$ | 2.09 | \$ | 1.38 | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - |
| Dividend per share (diluted) | \$ | 1.34 | \$ | 1.34 | \$ | 1.34 | \$ | 1.34 | \$ | 1.33 | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - |
| Equity cashflow per share (diluted including debt drawdowns) | \$ | 4.83 | \$ | 6.50 | \$ | 4.36 | \$ | 9.78 | \$ | 1.83 | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - | \$ | - |
| Check: Change in cash & equivalents | OK | | OK | (| OK. | | OK | | OK | | OK | | OK | | OK | | OK | | OK | | OK | | OK | | OK | |

Discounted Cashflow Valuation | Valuation Results (4/5)

| DCF Summary - Valuation Results | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------|----------|---------------|--------------|------------|-----------|-------|-------------|---------------|------------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | | | | | _ | | | | Cashflow F | Forecast | | | |
| *All dollar amounts in millions | | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019E | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025E | 2026E |
| Free cash flows to the firm for valuation (FCFF) | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | • |
| Enterprise Value EBITDA Multiple Method | | <u>_</u> | Enterprise \ | /alue Perp | etual Grov | vth Metho | d | WACC Ass | umptions | | | | | |
| EBITDA multiple | 0.0x | _ | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Terminal year EBITDA | - | | | | | | | Valuation d | ate | ; | 31-Jan-19 | | | |
| Revenue muliple | 0.0x | | | | | | | 10-yr US go | vernment b | ond rate | 0.0% | | | |
| Terminal year Revenue | - | | Perpetual gro | owth of firm | cash flov | 0.00% | | Expected m | narket returr | า | 0.0% | | | |
| Present value of terminal value | - | | Present value | e of termina | al value | - | | Market risk | premium | | 0.0% | | | |
| Present value of forecast FCF | - | | Present value | e of forecas | t FCF | - | | Beta | | | 0.00 | | | |
| Enterprise Value | - | | Enterprise \ | /alue | | - | | CAPM Cos | t of Equity | | 0.0% | | | |
| Debt | - | | Debt | | | - | | Cost of deb | t | | 0.0% | | | |
| Cash | - | | Cash | | | - | | Tax rate | | | 0.0% | | | |
| Equity Value (Market Cap) | - | | Equity Value | e (Market | Сар) | - | | After Tax (| Cost of Deb | t | 0.0% | | | |
| Shares outstanding | - | | Shares outst | anding | | - | | Target gear | ing | | 0.0% | | | |
| Fair Value Share Price | \$0.00 | | Fair Value S | Share Pric | е | \$0.00 | | WACC | | | 0.0% | | | |

Discounted Cashflow Valuation | Assumptions Document (5/5)

| Operating Assumptions | | | |
|--|------------|-----------|---------------|
| Key Metrics | CAGR/Avg | Long-Term | Justification |
| Total Revenue 'CAGR '18-'26) | (100.0)% | | |
| Coach Revenue 'CAGR '18-'26) | (100.0)% | | |
| Kate Spade Revenue CAGR '18-'26) | 0.0% | | |
| Stuart Weizman Revenue CAGR '18-'26) | (100.0)% | | |
| otal EBIT Margin A <i>vg '19-'</i> 26) | 0.0% | 0.0% | |
| Coach EBIT Margin (Avg '19-'26) | 0.0% | 0.0% | |
| Kate Spade EBIT Margin (Avg '19-'26) | 0.0% | 0.0% | |
| Stuart Weizman EBIT Margin Avg '19-'26) | 0.0% | 0.0% | |
| otal EBITDA CAGR '18-'26) | (100.0)% | | |
| Total EBITDA Margin (Avg '19-'26) | 0.0% | 0.0% | |
| Capex (% of revenue) Avg '19-'26) | 0.0% | | |
| | | | |
| Valuation Assumptions Key Metrics | Kay Matria | | Justification |
| | Key Metric | | Justilication |
| Beta | 0.00 | | |
| Risk-free rate | 0.0% | | |
| Cost of debt (pre-tax) | 0.0% | | |
| Perpetual growth rate | 0.0% | | |
| Exit multiple | 0.0x | | |

Trading Comparables Valuation | Summary (1/5)

| The component of the co | Company Name | Market | : Enterprise | Total | Cash & | Revenu | e EBITDA | Earnings | s Net Debt | / EV/ | Reven | ue ⁽²⁾ | EV | //EBITD | A ⁽²⁾ | P/E | (2) | EBITDA | CAGR (2) | Revenue | CAGR (2) | EBITDA | WAC |
|--|---------------------------|------------|----------------------|---------|------------|---------------------------------|----------|----------|------------|-------|-------|-------------------|--------|---------|------------------|------|------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|-------|
| Vivil | | Сар. | Value ⁽¹⁾ | Debt | S-t Inv. | NTM | NTM | NTM | EV | | | | LTM | NTM | 2020E | | | 3-Yr Hist. | 2-Yr Fcst. | 3-Yr Hist. | 2-Yr Fcst. | Margin (% |) |
| Vivil | (all figures presented in | USD millio | ons, except | per sha | re figures | or where | noted) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - | | - |
| Victor | | | - | • | • | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Caring | | | | | | | | | 0/ | 10.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0/ | 0/ | 0/ | 0/ | 0/ | 0.00/ |
| Addisor | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | | 8 | | | 1 | | | 8 | | 8 | | | | | |
| Note and part Note | • | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | | | | | 1 | | | 8 | | 4 | | R | | E . | |
| Name | | - | - | _ | - | _ | _ | _ | | 8 | | | 1 | | | 8 | | \$ | | 8 | | E . | |
| Brands | | | | | | | | | | 8 | | | 1 | | | 8 | | 5 | | | | 1 | |
| Brands | Average | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| apestry - - - - - - - - - | American Luxury Cong | glomerate | es | | | ******************************* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Note | L Brands | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Part | Tapestry | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Description | Michael Kors | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.09 |
| Christian Dior | Average | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Christian Dior | l uyury Annarel | | | | | | | | | • | | | | | | | | | | | | • | |
| Surberry | | | | | | | | | 0/ | 1000 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 1 0 00 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 1 0/ | 0/ | 1 0/ | 0/ | 0/ | 0.00 |
| Mancler | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | | | | | 1 | | | 8 | | 8 | | 8 | | E . | |
| tugo Boss | , | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | | | | | 1 | | | 8 | | \$ | | | | 1 | |
| ee Baker | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | | | | | 1 | | | 8 | | \$ | | A | | 1 | |
| - 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0 | • | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | | 1 | | | 1 | | | R . | | 3 | | 8 | | ł. | |
| Suxury Accessories | | - | | - | - | - | - | - | | * | | | 1 | | | * | | 3 | | 8 | | | |
| Hermes | Average | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Luxottica | Luxury Accessories | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Swatch Group | Hermes | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Fiffany & Co. | Luxottica | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.09 |
| Prada | Swatch Group | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Pandora | Tiffany & Co. | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.09 |
| Salvatore Ferragamo | Prada | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| Parinello Cucinelli | Pandora | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.09 |
| Padini | Salvatore Ferragamo | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.09 |
| od's | Brunello Cucinelli | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| verage - 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0. | Padini | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.09 |
| uxury Segments Average – 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0. | Tod's | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| | Average | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| anestry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 100x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 1.0x -% -% -% -% -% -% -% | Luxury Segments Ave | rage | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |
| | Tapestry | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | _ | 0.04 | 0 0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0% |

Trading Comparables Valuation | Summary (2/5)

| Company Name | Mark <u>et</u> | Enterprise | Total | ash & <u>S1</u> | Reven <u>ue</u> | EBITDA | Earnin <u>gs</u> | s Net Debt / | EV/ | Reven | ле ⁽²⁾ | EV. | /EBITD <i>#</i> | (2) | P/E | (2) | EBITDA | CAGR (2) | Revenue | CAGR (2) | EBITDA | WAC |
|----------------------------|------------------|---------------|---------|-----------------|-----------------|--------|------------------|--------------|------|-------|-------------------|------|-----------------|-------|------|------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----|
| | Сар. | Value (1) | Debt | Investm. | NTM | NTM | NTM | EV | LTM | | 2020E | LTM | NTM | 2020E | | | 3-Yr Hist. | 2-Yr Fcst. | 3-Yr Hist. | 2-Yr Fcst. | Margin (% | 6) |
| all figures presented in U | JSD millio | ons, except p | per sha | re figures d | or where n | noted) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 |
| pscale Brands | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ommy Hilfiger | - | _ | - | - | _ | _ | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0 |
| alph Lauren Corporation | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0 |
| arks & Spencer | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| teve Madden | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| verage | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0.0 |
| veryday Brands | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| &M | - | - | _ | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| ap | - | - | - | - | - | _ | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| merican Eagle | - | - | _ | - | _ | _ | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| xpress, Inc | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| verage | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| thletic Wear | | | | | | | | | • | | | • | | · | | | • | | | | | |
| ike | _ | _ | | _ | _ | _ | _ | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| didas | - | - | _ | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| ululemon Athletica | _ | - | _ | - | _ | _ | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| nder Armour | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| verage | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| ashion Retailers | | | | | | | | | | | | , | | | | | , | | | | | |
| ordstrom | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| udson's Bav | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| arFetch | - | - | - | - | - | _ | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| uckle | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| oni B | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| verage | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| elated Segments Ave | rago | | | | | | | _ | 0.0x | 0.0% | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| erateu Segments Ave | iay e | | | | | | | = | U.UX | U.UX | U.UX | U.UX | U.UX | U.UX | U.UX | U.UX | -70 | -70 | -70 | -70 | -70 | U. |
| umulative Average | | | | | | | | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| apestry | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | 0.0x | -% | -% | -% | -% | -% | 0. |
| • | | | | - | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 8 | | | |

Sources: Bloomberg, Company Information

⁽¹⁾ Enterprise Value is defined as market capitalization, plus total debt and minority interests less cash and short-term investments; ignores equity investments

⁽²⁾ Based on analyst consensus forecasts

Trading Comparables Valuation | Selection (3/5)

| Company Name | Yes | EV/Rev | <u>Yes</u> | EV/EBITDA | Valuation Rationale |
|---------------------------|--------|--------|------------|-----------|---------------------|
| | Incl.? | NTM | Incl.? | NTM | |
| | | | | | |
| Eurpoean Luxury Conglome | erates | | | | |
| LVMH | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Kering | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Inditex | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Richemont | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Average Selection | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| American Luxury Conglome | erates | | | | |
| Brands | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Tapestry | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Michael Kors | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Average Selection | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| Luxury Apparel | | | | | |
| Christian Dior | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Burberry | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Moncler | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Hugo Boss | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Ted Baker | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Average Selection | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| Luxury Accessories | | | | | |
| Hermes | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Luxottica | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Swatch Group | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Tiffany & Co. | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Prada | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Pandora | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Salvatore Ferragamo | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Brunello Cucinelli | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Padini | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Tod's | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Average Selection | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| Luxury Segments Selection | 1 | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| Tapestry | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| | | 0.00 | | 0.0.0 | |

Trading Comparables Valuation | Selection (4/5)

| Company Name | Yes | EV/Rev | Yes | EV/EBITDA | Valuation Rationale |
|----------------------------|--------|---|--------|---|--|
| | Incl.? | NTM | Incl.? | NTM | |
| | | | | | |
| Upscale Brands | | | | | |
| Tommy Hilfiger | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Ralph Lauren Corporation | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Marks & Spencer | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Steve Madden | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Average Selection | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| Everyday Brands | | | | | |
| H&M | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Gap | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| American Eagle | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Express, Inc | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Average Selection | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| Average Selection | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| Athletic Wear | | | | | |
| Nike | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Adidas | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Lululemon Athletica | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Under Armour | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Average Selection | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| Fashion Retailers | | | | | |
| Nordstrom | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Hudson's Bay | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| FarFetch | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Buckle | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Noni B | Yes | 0.0x | Yes | 0.0x | |
| Average Selection | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| Related Segments Selection | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| Related Segments Selection | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| Cumulative Selection | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| Tapestry | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| Selected Industry Multiple | | | 1 | | |
| Tapestry Metric (2019E) | | | 1 | | Note: Use "Incl.?" column to indicate whether a company should be included in the valuation [0 - No; 1 - Yes] |
| Total Enterprise Value | | | | | The state of the s |
| - Total Debt | | *************************************** | 1 | *************************************** | |
| - Preferred & ST Inv | | | | | |
| + Cash | | | | | |
| Equity Value | | | | | |
| Shares Outstanding (m) | | | | | |
| Fair Value Share Price | | | | | |
| | | | | | |

Trading Comparables Valuation | Calculations (5/5)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | EBITDA CAGR ⁽³⁾ | - | | |
|---|---------------------|----------------|--------|------|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----------|--------|----|----|-----------|--------|---------------|---------------|-----------------------|-----------|---------|-------|----------------------------|--------------|------------|------------------|
| Company | | | | | | | | | | | | | EV/Rev | | | EV/EBITE | | | | | | | | |
| Name (all times and the times are the times | Price (USD) | | | Debt | Investm. | NTM | NTM | NTM | Tot. Cap. | EBITDA | EV | EV | 2017A LTM | NTM 20 | | | | | LTM NTM | 2019E | 3-Yr Hist. 2-Yr Fcs | . 3-Yr Hist. | 2-Yr Fcst. | BETA WACC |
| (all figures presented in USD millions, Eurpoean Luxury Conglomerates LVMH Kering Inditex Richemont | except per snare ng | gures or where | notea) | | | | | | | | | | | | [use =IF(\$BF | P9/BW9<0,*N/A | k*,\$BP9/BW9) to avoi | a errorsj | | | | | | [use =IFERROR(AC |
| Average | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| American Luxury Conglomerates L Brands Tapestry Michael Kors | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Average | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Luxury Apparel Christian Dior Burberry Moncler Hugo Boss Ted Baker | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Average | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Luxury Accessories Hermes Lucotica Swatch Group Finds | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Average | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Upscale Brands Tommy Hilfiger Ralph Lauren Corporation Marks & Spencer Steve Madden | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Average | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Everyday Brands H&M Gap American Eagle Express, Inc | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Average | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A thletic Wear Nike Adidas Lululemon Athletica Under Armour | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Average | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fashion Retailers Nordstrom Hudson's Bay FarFetch Buckle Noni B | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Average | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tapestry | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Precedent Transactions Valuation | Summary (1/2)

| | | | ed Entity | | |
|--|--------------------|---|-----------|-----------|-------------------------------|
| | | EV/Revenue | | EV/EBITDA | |
| Target | Incl.? | <u>LTM</u> | Incl.? | LTM | Relevance to Target Valuation |
| (all figures presented in USD millions, except | t per share figure | s or where otherwise | noted) | | |
| | B | | | 2 | |
| Versace | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Perry Ellis | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Jimmy Choo | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Christian Dior | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Luxottica | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Hugo Boss | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| The Jones Group | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Loro Piana | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Cole Haan | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Brioni | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Jack Wolfskin | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Moncler | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Jimmy Choo | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Volcom | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Bulgari | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Bulgari | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Moncler | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| | Yes | 0.00 | Yes | 0.00 | |
| Average | | 0.0x | | 0.0x | |
| Tapestry | | | | | |
| Implied Enterprise Value | | | | , | 1 |
| Total Enterprise Value | | | | | 1 |
| - Debt | | | | | |
| - Preferred & Other | | | | | |
| + Cash | | | | | |
| Equity Value | | | | | |
| Shares Outstanding (millions) | | *************************************** | | | |
| Fair Value Share Price | | | | | |

Precedent Transactions Valuation | Calculations (2/2)

| Targe | | | Buyer | | | Tra | nsaction | | Lī | М | EV/L | гм ⁽²⁾ |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------|--------|--------------------|------|-----------|----------|---------|--------|---------|-------------------|
| Company | Туре | Company | Туре | EV (1) | Date | Year | Rationale | Impl, EV | Revenue | EBITDA | Revenue | EBITD |
| (all figures presented in USD million | s, except per share figure | s or where otherwise noted) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Versace | | Michael Kors | | | September 25, 2018 | 2018 | | | | | | |
| Perry Ellis | | Perry Ellis | | | July 2, 2018 | 2018 | | | | | | |
| Jimmy Choo | | Michael Kors | | | July 25, 2017 | 2017 | | | | | | |
| Christian Dior | | Semyrhamis | | | April 25, 2017 | 2017 | | | | | | |
| Luxottica | | Essilor | | | January 16, 2017 | 2017 | | | | | | |
| Hugo Boss | | PFC and Zignago | | | February 10, 2015 | 2015 | | | | | | |
| The Jones Group | | Sycamore | | | December 19, 2013 | 2013 | | | | | | |
| Loro Piana | | LVMH | | | July 8, 2013 | 2013 | | | | | | |
| Cole Haan | | Apax Partners | | | November 16, 2012 | 2012 | | | | | | |
| Brioni | | Kering | | | July 29, 2011 | 2011 | | | | | | |
| Jack Wolfskin | | Blackstone | | | July 21, 2011 | 2011 | | | | | | |
| Moncler | | Eurazeo | | | June 6, 2011 | 2011 | | | | | | |
| Jimmy Choo | | JAB Luxury | | | May 22, 2011 | 2011 | | | | | | |
| Volcom | | Kering | | | May 2, 2011 | 2011 | | | | | | |
| Bulgari | | LVMH | | | March 6, 2011 | 2011 | | | | | | |
| Bulgari | | LVMH | | | March 6, 2011 | 2011 | | | | | | |
| Moncler | | Carlyle | | | August 5, 2008 | 2008 | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | J | | | | L | | L | |
| Average | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Гареstry | | | | | | | | | | | | |

⁽¹⁾ Current EV

⁽²⁾ EV/LTM multiple should be calculated based on Transaction EV

Leveraged Buyout Valuation | Transaction Summary (1/3)

| March Mar | Assumed LBO Transaction Summary | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|---------------------------|--------|--------|--------------|---------------------|----------|-------|-------|---------------|---------|-------|-------|
| Part | Use of Funds | | | | Source of Fu | ınds | | | | | | | |
| Early Make 1,743 104 Assumed 1,743 104 Assumed 1,744 Assumed 1,744 | Tapestry | - | 0.0% | | Senior Debt | | | | | | | - | -% |
| Anne Anderson Anne Anne Anne Anne Anne Anne Anne An | Parent Equity Premium (0%) | - | 0.0% | | Junior Debt | | | | | | | - | -% |
| Transfering Content 1 | Equity Value | - | -% | | Revolver | | | | | | | - | -% |
| Springer Springer | Debt Retired / Assumed | 1,734 | 100.0% | | Assumed Deb | ot | | | | | | - | -% |
| Part | Transaction Costs | - | 0.0% | | Total Debt | | | | | | | - | -% |
| Part | | | | | Sponsor Equi | ty | | | | | | 491 | 28.3% |
| Part | | | | | Excess Balan | nce Sheet Cash (Sho | ortfall) | | | | | 1,243 | 71.7% |
| Seption Process Proc | Total Funds Uses | 1,734 | 100% | | Total Funds | Sources | | | | | | 1,734 | 100% |
| Profession Revenue Forecast | | | | | | | | | F | ost-LBO Tran | saction | | |
| Revenue & Margin Synergies EBITDA Contribution | Equity Cashflows | | | | | | 2019E | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025E |
| Professional EBITDA Forecast Average EBITDA Margin 0.0% | Proforma Revenue Forecast | Annual Revenue % Growth | 0.0% | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Cashiflow for Debt Service (post Taxes, Capex, 8 WC) | Revenue & Margin Synergies EBITDA Contribution | Annual Margin Improvement | 0.0% | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Mandatory Debt Service (Interest Expense) | Proforma EBITDA Forecast | Average EBITDA Margin | 0.0% | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Separament of LBO Debt Separament of LBO D | Cashflow for Debt Service (post Taxes, Capex, & WC) | | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Caparating Cashtllow for Equity | Mandatory Debt Service (Interest Expense) | | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Report R | Repayment of LBO Debt | | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Sales Proceeds (based on 0.0x LTM EBITDA multiple) Sales Proceeds (bas Proceeds (based on 0.0x LTM EBITDA multiple) Sales Proceeds (| Operating Cashflow for Equity | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Sexist Transaction Costs | LBO Sponsor Equity | | | | | | (491) | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Note of the content | Sales Proceeds (based on 0.0x LTM EBITDA multiple) | | | | | _ | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Figure Premium Premi | (-) Exit Transaction Costs | | Cu | urrent | \$38.93 | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| PREsidual Cash Flows IRR 0.00% (491) 1 | (-) Remaining Debt at Exit | | Of | ffered | \$38.93 | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| RR 0.00% (491) 1 | (+) Excess Cash | | Pr | remium | 0% | | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Post | (+) Residual Cash Flows | | | | | _ | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Dustsanding Debt Balance 2019E 2021E 2021E 2023E 2024E 2025E Unior Debt Repayment | Net Equity Cashflows | | IR | :R | 0.00% | | (491) | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Dunior Debt Repayment | | | | | | | | | F | Post-LBO Tran | saction | | |
| Senior Debt Ending Balance at 0.0% | Outstanding Debt Balance | | | | | | 2019E | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025E |
| Senior Debt Repayment | Junior Debt Repayment | | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Senior Debt Ending Balance at 0.0% - | Junior Debt Ending Balance at 0.0% | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Revolver Debt Repayment - <td>Senior Debt Repayment</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td></td> | Senior Debt Repayment | | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Revolver Debt Ending Balance at 0.0% - | Senior Debt Ending Balance at 0.0% | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Assumed Debt Repayment Assumed Debt Ending Balance at 0.0% Fotal Debt Ending Balance Debt/EBITDA Cashflows for Debt Service / Total Interest Expense | Revolver Debt Repayment | | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Assumed Debt Ending Balance at 0.0% | Revolver Debt Ending Balance at 0.0% | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Fotal Debt Ending Balance - <td>Assumed Debt Repayment</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td></td> | Assumed Debt Repayment | | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Debt/EBITDA NM | Assumed Debt Ending Balance at 0.0% | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Cashflows for Debt Service / Total Interest Expense 0.0x NM NM NM NM NM NM NM NM | Total Debt Ending Balance | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Cashflows for Debt Service / Total Interest Expense 0.0x NM NM NM NM NM NM NM NM | Debt/EBITDA | | | | | | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM |
| · | Cashflows for Debt Service / Total Interest Expense | | | | | | 0.0x | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | |
| | Cashflows for Debt Service / Senior Interest Expense | | | | | | 0.0x | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM |

Leveraged Buyout Valuation | Cashflow Summary (2/3)

| Detailed LBO Cashflow Summary | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-------|---------|-------|--------|-------|----------|-------|-------|--------------|----------|-------|-------|
| · | | | | | | | | | Post-LBO Tra | nsaction | | |
| *All dollar amounts in millions | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019E | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025E |
| Standalone Revenues | 4,806 | 4,192 | 4,492 | 4,488 | 5,880 | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Revenue Synergies | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Proforma Revenue Forecast | 4,806 | 4,192 | 4,492 | 4,488 | 5,880 | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Revenue Growth | | (12.8)% | 7.2% | (0.1)% | 31.0% | (100.0)% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Standalone EBITDA | 1,501 | 964 | 978 | 1,086 | 1,147 | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Revenue & Margin Synergies EBITDA Contribution | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Proforma EBITDA Forecast | 1,501 | 964 | 978 | 1,086 | 1,147 | - | - | - | - | - | - | + |
| EBITDA Margin | 31.2% | 23.0% | 21.8% | 24.2% | 19.5% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Taxes | (341) | (209) | (166) | (168) | (199) | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Capex | (220) | (199) | (396) | (283) | (267) | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Change in Working Capital | (178) | 175 | (23) | (38) | 111 | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Cashflow for Debt Service (post Taxes, Capex, & WC) | 763 | 731 | 393 | 597 | 792 | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Interest Expense on Existing Debt | 2 | (6) | (27) | (28) | (74) | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Senior LBO Debt Interest Expense | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Junior LBO Debt Interest Expense | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Mandatory Debt Service (Interest Expense) | 2 | (6) | (27) | (28) | (74) | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Debt/EBITDA | | | | | | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM |
| Cashflows for Debt Service / Total Interest Expense | | | | | | | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM |
| Cashflows for Debt Service / Senior Interest Expense | | | | | | | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM | NM |
| FCF for LBO Debt Repayment | 765 | 724 | 366 | 568 | 718 | - | | - | - | - | - | |
| Repayment of LBO Debt | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Residual Cashflow after LBO Debt Service | | | | | | | _ | - | - | - | - | |
| LBO Purchase | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Excess Cash on Balance Sheet | | | | | | 1,243 | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | |
| Equity Issuance for LBO | | | | | | 491 | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | |
| Senior LBO Debt Issuance | | | | | | - | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | |
| Junior LBO Debt Issuance | | | | | | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | |
| LBO Purchase Price | | | | | | (1,734) | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | |
| Equity IRR Calculation | | | | | | (, - , | | | | | | |
| LBO Sponsor Equity | | | | | | (491) | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | |
| Sale Proceeds | | | | | | - | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | |
| Transaction Costs (Exit) | | | | | | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | |
| Repayment of Debt | | | | | | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | |
| Excess Cash | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Residual Cashflows | | | | | | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Cash Flows to Equity IRR: | -% | | | | | (491) | | | - | | - | |

Leveraged Buyout Valuation | Assumptions Document (3/3)

| LBO Assumtions | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|
| Key Levers | Values | Justification |
| Debt/EBITDA | NM | |
| Interest Rates (Senior / Junior) | 0.0% / 0.0% | |
| Premium | 0.0% | |
| Exit Multiple | 0.0x | |
| Revenue Increase | 0.0% | |
| EBITDA Margin Improvement | 0.0% | |

VANCOUVER NEW YORK TORONTO







Morgan Stanley


































































About NIBC

Established in 2007, the National Investment Banking Competition (NIBC) brings together over 1,600 competitors from 150 universities and 150 professionals in an annual transaction advisory competition. NIBC was founded on the guiding principle of giving students from any background an equal opportunity to showcase their skills on a global stage and connect with recruiters from financial centers around the world. Run by a team of dedicated students and with the generous support of corporate sponsors and board members, NIBC has become the first and largest international investment banking competition globally.

Competition & Case Contact Information

The NIBC Organizing Team would like to thank you for your interest in NIBC 2018. For further inquiries, please copy the following contacts:

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